Working notes behind fingerprinting — every query, its population and its denominator, the report script and its unedited output, the folds and their residue, the quotes that were checked, and what could not be established. Corpus-level caveats that apply to every page on this site are on corpus and are not restated here.

Recorded. This page has an unusually delicate population, because “fingerprint” is at least eight unrelated literatures in a broad security corpus.

The 103 exclusions are deliberate and are the page's largest judgement call: “we detected X by fingerprinting the TLS stack” is a paper about X, not a paper about fingerprinting. It also means 83 is a floor, and the page says so.

cd /workspace/artifacts/wiki
node scripts/report_fingerprinting.mjs            # every figure, the residue, the 83-paper list
node scripts/report_fingerprinting.mjs --wiki
node scripts/quote_check.mjs --detection 'fingerprint'
node scripts/check_page_numbers.mjs \
  pages/privacy_fingerprinting.txt out/new/report_fingerprinting.txt \
  '===== What the Word Means in the Literature =====' \
  '===== Defences, and What They Mean for Your Measurement ====='

check_page_numbers.mjs left four figures unaccounted, all deliberate: 2,300 (a participant-count range quoted from the papers), 4,322 (the old corpus size, quoted as history), and 66.2 / 76.9 (corpus-wide artifact-release rates, from data/extract/OVERVIEW.md rather than this report).

Recorded. Old = 4,322-paper corpus. New = 5,859-paper corpus. Note that the fold changed too, so several rows mix corpus growth with better folding; §5 separates them where it can.

Moved by more than a rounding step:

• The venue ranking reordered. TheWebConf and PETS are now joint-first at 17 papers each (was USENIX and WWW at 13). PETS is still the densest by share (3.3%), but by a factor of two to three rather than two to four.
• The two top “surface” rows swapped, 34 uniqueness against 33 script-detection, from a tie at 25. This is inside the noise of a free-text field and the page says the point is unchanged, but the ordering of the table changed and a reader comparing revisions would notice.
• Website-fingerprinting density pulls ahead in 2025–2026, 22.8 per 1,000 against browser fingerprinting's 15.2, after four windows of near-parity. On two provisional venue-years. The page flags it and declines to draw a conclusion.
• A new family, LLM / model identification. One paper — USENIX/2025/llmmap-fingerprinting-for-large-language-models, four tuples. Given its own family rather than folded into Home-grown or Remote host, so that whoever refreshes this next can see whether it is one paper or a literature.
• Proposes a system, attack or defence fell from 69.5% to 65.1%. studyTypes is the least stable field in the schema (57% run-to-run per OVERVIEW.md), so this should not be read as a change in the field.

Recorded. This is the headline methodological finding of the refresh. On the 4,322-paper corpus fp_fold.mjs left 5 unmapped tuples in 4 papers. On the 5,859-paper corpus, unchanged, it left 59 tuples in 31 papers — 11.1% of the population, which would have shipped as an “unmapped” row bigger than four of the real families.

What arrived was new subject matter, not new phrasing. The 2025–2026 slice fingerprints things that did not appear in the corpus before. Every new string and where it went:

Residue after, in full — 7 tuples, 6 papers:

CCS/2011/bitshred-feature-hashing-malware-…            Fingerprint similarity approximation
USENIX/2016/an-empirical-study-of-textual-key-…        Fingerprint comparison speed
USENIX/2016/identifying-and-characterizing-sybils-…    Fingerprint changes
CCS/2019/privacy-aspects-and-subliminal-channels-…     value fingerprinting
CCS/2019/privacy-aspects-and-subliminal-channels-…     fingerprint survival
USENIX/2025/shadows-in-cipher-spaces-…                 Application page fingerprints
NDSS/2026/snpeek-side-channel-analysis-…               PHH fingerprinting leakage

The first five are the original residue and are genuinely other literatures: malware feature hashing, PGP key-fingerprint strings, Tor relay identity keys, Zcash transaction values. The two new ones are memory side channels in confidential VMs — identifying which application is resident from encrypted-memory or page-hash patterns. They were deliberately left unmapped. They are close to Website / traffic fingerprinting in question (“which thing is the victim running?”) and close to Physical-object in channel, and folding them either way would have overstated the fold's confidence in a genuinely new literature. A reasonable person would fold them; recording the choice is the point.

The last time bucket was (y) ⇒ y >= 2022 rather than 2022–2024. Under a corpus ending in 2024 that is correct; under this one it swallowed 2025 and 2026 and reported the 2022–2024 corpus size as 3,140 instead of 1,955. Split, and a starred 2025–2026 added. A second hardcoded value — “corpus-wide: 262 of 5859” in the legal section — mixed the old numerator with the new denominator, which is the worst kind of stale number because it looks freshly computed. Both fixed. Any figure copied from those two places before 2026-08-12 is wrong.

Recorded, 2026-08-12.

$ node scripts/quote_check.mjs --detection 'fingerprint'
544 quotes checked: 312 exact, 140 partial (>=60% of 5-word windows),
92 below threshold, 0 with no full text on disk.

92 below threshold were not all read. Five were sampled and checked by hand against paper.cols.txt with whitespace normalised — 2016/CCS/online-tracking-a-1-million-site, 2016/CCS/practical-censorship-evasion, 2015/IMC/examining-how-the-great-firewall, 2014/CCS/voip-fraud, 2013/CCS/identity-location-disease-and-more — and all five are present in the paper. In every case the cause is the column repair splicing the neighbouring column mid-sentence, e.g.:

two Figure 6 shows one of two audio fingerprinting configura-
fingerprinting scripts utilizing the API during our manual
tions found in three scripts. The second configuration uti-
analysis of other fingerprinting te…

That is the extraction's “We discovered two fingerprinting scripts utilizing the API during our manual analysis of other fingerprinting techniques” — correct, and unfindable by exact match.

Reconstructed: the original run recorded only that “every figure above was checked against the source PDF text for a sample of its evidence quotes”. Which sample is not recoverable. The page's old claim that 0.9% of dataset quotes are unlocatable is a dataset-wide figure from the earlier run, not a measurement of this page, and it has not been re-measured; the page now says so.

Reconstructed. Not re-verified on 2026-08-12.

• All uniqueness/stability/defence claims are cited to papers in bibliography: Eckersley, Gulyás et al., Gómez-Boix et al., Vastel et al. (FP-Stalker and FP-Scanner), Pugliese et al., Laor et al., Datta et al., Berke et al.
• The four “not comparable” prevalence figures were each read from the paper, not from a secondary summary. Getting the denominators right — Alexa 10K vs 100K vs 1M, site vs script vs provider — is the whole point of that table, and it is the kind of thing that is wrong in most related-work sections.
• The “2025 policy reversal” section rests on vendor and standards announcements checked by the original run in August 2026. It is the part of this page most likely to be stale first, and nothing in this refresh touched it.

Rejected: not recorded for the original run — a gap, and the reason §11 records them explicitly.

• Whether the 87 unread below-threshold quotes check out. See §6.
• Where the two memory-side-channel papers belong. See §5.
• Whether LLM fingerprinting is a literature. One paper. Ask again on the next refresh; if it is still one paper in a complete 2026, the family should probably be merged away.
• The DRAWN APART duplicate is still there. It appears twice in NDSS 2022, once under its title slug and once as auto-draft-242. Both records are in the 83. Two other papers in the corpus have the same duplication (detecting-and-characterizing-social-spam-campaigns, uiscope), neither of them in this population. This is a corpus-index defect, not a page defect, and belongs on corpus.
• CHI and SOUPS are absent, and the usability side of fingerprinting defences publishes there. That is the page's most important coverage gap and it is stated on the page.
• Whether the 103 technique-only exclusions are all correctly excluded. The rule is defensible and it has never been audited paper by paper.

Recorded. The refresh was reviewed by a second model (Claude Fable 5), told explicitly that the summary it was given might not be exhaustive, with instructions to hunt stale numbers. It found a systematic defect, not a scatter of typos, and it is worth stating because it will recur on the next refresh:

• check_page_numbers.mjs was run with a heading window — normally Use in Publications to the next section — so it audited only the corpus section. Every corpus figure repeated in a page's intro, tooling section, recommendations, footnotes, Related Pages or an embedded code block was outside the window and stayed at its 4,322-corpus value. Across the six pages 29 such figures survived the first pass.
• The matcher was substring, not word-boundary, so report.includes('59') was satisfied by 11.59 bits. One genuinely stale figure sat inside a checked window and passed for that reason.

Both are fixed in scripts/check_page_numbers.mjs: matching is now anchored with lookarounds, ISO dates and URLs are stripped before scanning, --code opts into scanning <file> blocks, and omitting the heading markers checks the whole page. Run it windowed and whole-page. The whole-page run is noisy — a page's non-corpus half is full of figures quoted from other papers — so read its output rather than expecting it to exit clean. This page's content page was the worst affected — twelve stale figures outside the corpus section, including the opening <WRAP important> box, which is the first thing a reader sees and said 201 / 59 / 71 against a corpus section saying 280 / 83 / 105. Also fixed: OpenWPM 12 → 15, Tracker Radar Collector 3 → 6 (it contradicted the page's own tool table), FingerprintJS 9 → 14, puppeteer-extra-plugin-stealth 1 → 2, legal 7 of 59 → 10 of 83, and two Related-Pages shares.

Two claims were not stale but false, and had to be re-derived rather than renumbered. Both are recorded here because they go beyond the mechanical brief:

1. The Defences section said “the corpus behind this page ends in 2024 — so there is currently no peer-reviewed measurement in these seven venues of the post-reversal web”, of Google's 16 February 2025 fingerprinting-policy change. The corpus now contains 18 browser-FP papers from 2025–2026, and Luo et al. (IMC 2025) crawled the Tranco top 20K in May 2025, three months after the change. Verified against 2025/IMC/canvassing-the-fingerprinters…/paper.cols.txt: “We performed the crawls in May 2025 using a UCSD IP address” and “canvas fingerprinting is relatively modest, found in 12.7% of popular and 9.9% of tail sites” (the paper also gives the count directly: “2,067 (12.7%) of them extracted at least one fingerprintable canvas”). The claim was replaced with the measurement; the open question was narrowed to the pre/post comparison, which still does not exist.
2. The open question “no study quantifies how much a headless or containerised crawler under-counts fingerprinting” is partly answered by Annamalai et al. (TheWebConf 2025), verified against 2025/WWW/beyond-the-crawl…: “471 such fingerprinting websites, out of which the automated crawl missed 211 (45%)”. Narrowed rather than deleted: the paper attributes the gap to interaction depth, authentication and consent rather than to headless-vs-headful specifically, which is what the open question actually asks.

Both papers were added to bibliography as luo2025_canvassing and annamalai2025_beyond (duplicate-key check first, cache purged, keys confirmed rendering).

Recorded. The step-9 generic review was skipped for budget when this page was written, and was run on 2026-09-03 as its own task. The reviewer (Claude Fable) was given the content page, the provenance page, report_fingerprinting.mjs, fp_fold.mjs and a re-run of the report against the current corpus, and was told explicitly that the author's context might not be exhaustive and that the three focused passes (figures-vs-script, citations-and-quotes, external currency) had already run — so its budget should go on what none of them was looking for. No checklist was given.

The corpus did not change between 2026-08-12 and this pass: still data/extract/run1, 5,859 papers. Every figure below was re-derived, not carried over.

Three defects were found by the author while preparing the reviewer's bundle. They are recorded here because two of them are the kind a reviewer brief does not own.

What B would have produced, run against the same 280 papers (left: the committed module and the published table; right: the code the page actually published):

family                   real  published-excerpt
traffic-analysis          105         89
browser-device             83         65
network-stack              38         23
physical-forensic          28          9
biometric                  16          2
device-hardware            13          3
media-content               8          0
unmapped                    6         92
evasion-environment         2          0
llm-model                   1          1

The unmapped row is the one that matters: the page's headline methodological claim is that the fold leaves 7 tuples in 6 papers unassigned. Under the published code it leaves 92 papers, 32.9% of the population. The page was honest about the block being an excerpt — it said so on its line 15 — but an excerpt that changes every number beneath it is not an audit trail, and “the full module … is in the wiki repository” pointed at a repository neither page links because none is public.

Fifteen findings. Thirteen accepted, two accepted in part. Every load-bearing claim was verified against a primary source before acting — the reviewer was right on each one that was checked, which is worth recording as much as any rejection would be.

• Whether the “59 tuples in 31 papers” counterfactual can be reproduced. The content page says the pre-2026-08-12 fold would have left that residue on the current corpus. That figure is recorded in §5 but no published artefact can regenerate it, because the old fold was overwritten rather than kept. It is the one number on the page a reader cannot check. Keeping a dated copy of a fold before widening it would close this; it was not done.
• Whether the 103 technique-only exclusions are correctly excluded. Unchanged from §8 — still never audited paper by paper.
• Whether the surface-dating box is complete. Four surfaces were dated against primary sources. WebRTC, AudioContext and the extension-enumeration channels were not re-checked against current browser behaviour, and a reader should not read their absence from the box as “unchanged”.
• The 2025 policy-reversal section was not re-verified in this pass. §7's warning still stands: it is the part of the page most likely to be stale first.

Rejected:

• The Web Almanac / HTTP Archive fingerprinting figure the reviewer suggested adding (“FingerprintJS on 0.57% of sites, 2024 chapter”). Not verified against the chapter, so not published. HTTP Archive is a legitimate dataset for this page and a future pass should add it — with the figure read out of the chapter, not out of a review summary.
• The reviewer's “score 0–3” for Tracker Radar's fingerprinting field. The documentation says only “likelihood”; values 1, 2 and 3 were observed. The page states what was observed and does not assert the range.
• The reviewer's claim that VisibleV8 is “the instrumentation behind the 2025 CCS function-level V8-bytecode detector”. No such paper was located in the five VisibleV8 users in this population; the page names the 2021, 2023 and 2026 papers that were verified instead.

Re-run on 2026-09-03 against data/extract/run1 (5,859 papers) after the residue fix. This is the complete output, not an extract — including the tool residue (§11.2 #4) and the 83-paper list (§11.2 #9), both of which the page previously promised and did not publish.

$ node scripts/report_fingerprinting.mjs

fp_report_2026-09-03.txt

corpus                                        5859 papers
detection fired at all                        5655 papers
phenomenon names a fingerprint                280 papers
only the technique does (excluded)             103 papers
 
## What "fingerprinting" means in this corpus
 
459 distinct free-text strings across 280 papers.
 
What was being fingerprinted               Papers  Share of 280  Distinct strings
-----------------------------------------  ------  ------------  ----------------
Website / traffic fingerprinting           105     37.5%         136
Browser fingerprinting (the web platform)  83      29.6%         156
Remote host & network-stack ID             38      13.6%         53
Physical-object & hardware forensics       28      10.0%         54
Human biometrics                           16      5.7%          24
Off-web device identification              13      4.6%          18
Media content identification               8       2.9%          11
unmapped                                   6       2.1%          7
Analysis-environment evasion               2       0.7%          4
LLM / model identification                 1       0.4%          4
 
Shares exceed 100%: 18 papers (6.4%) fall in more than one family.
 
Tuples: 544 total — 441 resolved by the string, 76 by paper context (property-only strings), 7 unresolved.
95 of 544 strings name only a property of a fingerprint, not its subject.
 
## Unmapped residue (printed in full)
 
7 tuples, 6 papers
  CCS/2011/bitshred-feature-hashing-malware-for-scalable-triage-and-semantic-analysis
      Fingerprint similarity approximation
  USENIX/2016/an-empirical-study-of-textual-key-fingerprint-representations
      Fingerprint comparison speed
  USENIX/2016/identifying-and-characterizing-sybils-in-the-tor-network
      Fingerprint changes
  CCS/2019/privacy-aspects-and-subliminal-channels-in-zcash
      value fingerprinting
  CCS/2019/privacy-aspects-and-subliminal-channels-in-zcash
      fingerprint survival
  USENIX/2025/shadows-in-cipher-spaces-exploiting-tweak-repetition-in-hardware-memory-encrypti
      Application page fingerprints
  NDSS/2026/snpeek-side-channel-analysis-for-privacy-applications-on-confidential-vms
      PHH fingerprinting leakage
 
## The browser-fingerprinting subset: 83 papers
 
Property                                 Papers  Share of 83
---------------------------------------  ------  -----------
measured the web platform                78      94.0%
measured mobile                          16      19.3%
ran an automated web crawl               57      68.7%
empirical (measured the world as it is)  82      98.8%
proposes a system, attack or defence     54      65.1%
reanalyses an existing dataset           36      43.4%
recruited human participants             19      22.9%
assessed a law                           10      12.0%
released an artifact link                77      92.8%
 
## Over time, and by venue
 
Bucket      Corpus papers  Browser FP  Per 1,000 papers  Website/traffic FP  Per 1,000
----------  -------------  ----------  ----------------  ------------------  ---------
2010–2013   511            3           5.9               7                   13.7
2014–2017   769            10          13.0              11                  14.3
2018–2021   1439           23          16.0              25                  17.4
2022–2024   1955           29          14.8              35                  17.9
2025–2026*  1185           18          15.2              27                  22.8
 
Venue    Corpus papers  Browser FP  Share of venue
-------  -------------  ----------  --------------
WWW      843            17          2.0%
PETS     510            17          3.3%
USENIX   1410           14          1.0%
CCS      990            11          1.1%
NDSS     701            9           1.3%
IEEE-SP  767            9           1.2%
IMC      638            6           0.9%
 
## Which surfaces and questions the browser-FP papers name
 
Surface or question                             Papers  Share of 83
----------------------------------------------  ------  -----------
Uniqueness / entropy / anonymity set            34      41.0%
Fingerprinting scripts as the detection target  33      39.8%
Canvas                                          23      27.7%
Stability & evolution over time                 14      16.9%
Fonts                                           11      13.3%
Audio (AudioContext / Web Audio)                10      12.0%
Browser extensions as a signal                  10      12.0%
Defences & their resistance                     9       10.8%
WebGL / GPU                                     8       9.6%
navigator / User-Agent / plugins                6       7.2%
WebRTC                                          6       7.2%
Timing & clock                                  4       4.8%
Screen & display                                3       3.6%
Device sensors (motion, battery)                2       2.4%
TLS / network-layer signal                      0       0.0%
 
A paper can name several; shares do not sum. Rankings, not precise figures — the underlying field is free text.
 
## Tools and resources, folded across spellings
 
Of 83 browser-FP papers, tools used or produced (`usedOrMentioned` filtered):
Tool family                       Papers  Share of 83
--------------------------------  ------  -----------
EasyList / EasyPrivacy            19      22.9%
OpenWPM                           15      18.1%
FingerprintJS                     14      16.9%
Disconnect list                   13      15.7%
Brave                             7       8.4%
Tracker Radar Collector           6       7.2%
uBlock Origin                     6       7.2%
FP-Inspector                      4       4.8%
AmIUnique                         4       4.8%
Panopticlick / Cover Your Tracks  2       2.4%
Tor Browser                       2       2.4%
puppeteer-extra-plugin-stealth    2       2.4%
FP-Scanner / FP-Collect           1       1.2%
FPMON                             1       1.2%
 
Unmapped tool residue: 398 distinct names not in TOOL_FAMILIES, of which 55 are named by 2 or more of the 83 papers. Those 55, in full:
Unmapped tool name        Papers
------------------------  ------
chrome                    22
firefox                   13
selenium                  13
puppeteer                 12
esprima                   6
python                    6
chrome devtools protocol  5
chromium                  5
docker                    5
random forest             5
virustotal                5
visiblev8                 5
aws                       4
cookiepedia               4
edge                      4
mitmproxy                 4
scikit-learn              4
browserstack              3
frida                     3
opera                     3
playwright                3
safari                    3
adblockparser             2
adguard                   2
appium                    2
aws ec2                   2
consent-o-matic           2
ghostery                  2
grid'5000                 2
jsbeautifier              2
k-nearest neighbors       2
kraken                    2
lighthouse                2
logistic regression       2
louvain method            2
mcafee                    2
mystique                  2
postgresql                2
prolific                  2
python requests           2
qualtrics                 2
random forest (custom)    2
redis                     2
samsung remote test lab   2
scikit-optimize           2
selenium webdriver        2
semi-hard triplet loss    2
sunspider                 2
tranco                    2
v8                        2
wayback machine           2
webgl                     2
webshrinker               2
xhound                    2
xvfb                      2
The remaining 343 appear in one paper each and are listed below.
a-miu nique, adblock plus, adblock-rs, adblockplus, adguard chinese ads filter, adguard's base filter, adguard's mobile ads filter, adguard's tracking protection filter, adobe flash, adservers list, amazon ec2, amazon mechanical turk, anaeng, android app, android debug bridge, android debug bridge (adb), android emulator, android studio, angular 11.0.4, anubis, apache, apidiff, apktool, appbrain, aristaeus, audio-fingerprint test page, autoconsent, aware, aws lightsail, bad-asn-list, bag-of-words model (custom), better tracker blocker, bfad, binomial cdf, blindelephant, bluecava, botd, browsec vpn, browser polygraph, browserleaks, browserling, browserprint, burp suite, caniuse, cantina+, canvas defender, carnus, carnus honeypage, celery, chameleon, charles web-proxy, chatgpt, chi-squared tests of independence, chrome developer tools, chrome devtools protocol (cdp), chrome extension, chrome remote debugging protocol, chrome-remoteinterface, chromevox, chromium 117.0, chromium browser extension, chromium profiler, cisco talos, clientjs, clientsim, cloud firebase, cloudflare domain intelligence api, coinbase, convolutional neural network, convolutional neural network (cnn), cookie database, cookiebot, cookiegraph, crossbrowsertesting, crt.sh, cryptofp, css-inline, custom android app, custom chrome browser extension, custom chrome extension, custom chromium-based crawler, custom crawler, custom differential grammar-based fuzzer, custom eme javascript script, custom fingerprinting analysis pipeline, custom fingerprinting heuristics, custom imss identifier, custom javascript integration, custom parsers, custom regular-expression library, custom script, custom template-attack framework, d rawn a part, data collection browser extensions, datadome, dbscan, decision tree, deep convolutional neural network, didomi, doccano, docker compose, dolphin, drawnapart, droidbot, duckduckgo autoconsent, duckduckgo entity map, duckduckgo web tracker blocklist, elasticsearch, embedding model with glove, eme track, ermes proxy, estraverse, exthouse, extremely randomized trees, f5 bot and fraud detection/defense platform, fakeium, fanboy, fasttext, fathom, feed-forward neural network (custom), fingeprintls (fptls), fingerprint analysis tool, fingerprinting script (custom), firefox for android, flask, floc, foxhound, fp-extractor, fp-fed, fp-rainbow, fp-spoofer, fpcentral, fpserver, fptrace, fritap, fully connected neural network (multilayer perceptron classifier), google chrome, google chrome m114, google closure compiler, google cloud vision api, google compute engine, google natural language processing api, google public dns, google safe browsing, google search, google translate, google-play-scraper, google's natural language api, gridsearchcv, guimark, gummy browser, hostinger, hosttracker, html5 web cryptography api, https everywhere, hugging face's trainer, huggingface trainer api, ibm watson speech to text, ida pro, ie, imagehash, infomeasure, instrumented chromium, instrumented firefox, ip2location lite ip-asn database, ipinfo, ipinfo dataset, ipregistry, ipstack, isolation forest, jaccard similarity, jadx, javascript, javascript obfuscator tool, javascript template attacks, javascript-obfuscator, jaws, jax/tensorflow, jeb, jenks natural breaks, js-beautify, jsbench, jshelter, jsnice, jsrestrictor, jstap, jupyter notebooks, justdomains, keras, kmeans clustering algorithm, kubernetes, lda, leakage detector, let's encrypt, levenshtein distance, lightbeam, local dns stub resolver, local stand-in server, longest common subsequence (lcs), magisk, maxmind geoip, maxmind geolite2, maxmind minfraud api, mcafee smartfilter internet database, mdn web api, mdn web apis, mdn web docs, memento api, metamask, metamask automator, microsoft smartscreen, minfraud, modernizr, modheader, mongodb, moss, mozilla developer network (mdn), mozilla firefox, namecheap, network advertising initiative (nai), nginx, nltk, nodejs, nordvpn, noscript, nrc lexicon, nvda, ocr library, omnicrawl, onetrust, ontheflydom, pagegraph crawler, pandas, panoptichrome, paraphrase-multilingual-mpnet-base-v2, performance api, performancenavigationtiming api, peter-lowe's blocklist, petinspector, petportal, phash, phishprint, php, polisis, prebid.js, prefixlsh, principal component analysis, priv-accept, privacy pioneer, privaricator, prototype analyzer, puppeteercluster, pyautogui, pydnsbl, pysimilar, python difflib.sequencematcher, python's cookie jar, pytorch, pyvirtualdisplay, quantcast, raccoon app downloader, raider, random forest (rf), random forest ensemble classifier, ratcliff-obershelp, ratcliff-obershelp algorithm, ray tune, recaptcha v2, regular expressions, relevantid, request interceptor, requests, resnet50, resource timing api, routeviews, safari content blocker api, safedns website categorization service, samsung internet browser, savitzky-golay filter, scikit-learn resample, scrapy, seclists, selenium chromedriver, sentencetransformers, shap, simhash, spacy, spartacus, sqlite, standard scaler, strace, stress, stylisticfp, support vector machines (svm), svm, svm (custom), tailscale, talkback, tcpdump, tensorflow, tensorflow.js, texttiling, tf-idf, three.js, time-series k-means with dynamic time warping, tinybert, tinyproxy, tldextract, tor, tor proxy list, trackerlist, trackingexcavator, transformer, treeinterpreter, trendmicro, ua parser, uiharvester, uniquemachine, user agent switcher, user timing api, virtualbox, virustotal api, visiblejs, voiceover, wallet simulator, web idl, webrate, webviewtracer, webxray, weka, wepawet, wespoofed, wget, whatweb, whoer, whois, whotracks.me, whotracksme, widevine integration platform, windows sysinternals, word2vec, xgboost, yandex browser
 
Classification resources named by the same 83 papers:
Resource family                   Papers
--------------------------------  ------
EasyList / EasyPrivacy            17
Disconnect list                   13
FP-Inspector                      5
FingerprintJS                     4
Tracker Radar Collector           2
OpenWPM                           1
Panopticlick / Cover Your Tracks  1
FP-Scanner / FP-Collect           1
Brave                             1
uBlock Origin                     1
FPMON                             1
 
Folding check — FingerprintJS appears under 7 spellings here: fingerprintjs, fingerprintjs2, FingerprintJS2, Fingerprint2, FingerprintJS, FPJS Pro, Fingerprintjs2 (FPJS2)
 
## Crawl configuration: 57 of 83 ran a crawl, 57 recorded a configuration
 
crawlConfig field  States a value  Share of 57  All 1080 crawling papers
-----------------  --------------  -----------  ------------------------
statefulness       21              36.8%        21.9%
interactionDepth   52              91.2%        77.9%
consentAction      39              68.4%        54.2%
headless           10              17.5%        13.0%
authentication     55              96.5%        72.1%
browsers           44              77.2%        49.0%
 
Browser driven (folded)                Papers
-------------------------------------  ------
Chrome / Chromium                      29
Firefox (incl. versions)               17
IE                                     1
Opera                                  1
default browser                        1
Spartacus browser                      1
Brave                                  1
Tor Browser                            1
DuckDuckGo                             1
Ghostery                               1
Android WebView                        1
basic HTTP fetcher                     1
Puppeteer/TRC desktop browser          1
Puppeteer/TRC emulated mobile browser  1
 
## Prevalence claims stated by browser-FP papers
 
81 of 83 state a headline prevalence for a browser-FP phenomenon (97.6%).
 
  2012 NDSS/host-fingerprinting-and-tracking-on-the-web-privacy-and-security-implications
      Browser fingerprint entropy — UA+IP entropy was 20.29 bits
  2013 IEEE-SP/cookieless-monster-exploring-the-ecosystem-of-web-based-device-fingerprinting
      commercial web fingerprinting adoption — 40 sites (0.4% of the Alexa top 10,000)
  2013 IEEE-SP/cookieless-monster-exploring-the-ecosystem-of-web-based-device-fingerprinting
      browser-family fingerprinting — Each browser family had at least two unique features
  2013 IEEE-SP/cookieless-monster-exploring-the-ecosystem-of-web-based-device-fingerprinting
      browser-version fingerprinting — 71 sets identified specific Google Chrome versions
  2013 IEEE-SP/cookieless-monster-exploring-the-ecosystem-of-web-based-device-fingerprinting
      system fingerprinting plugins — Two of three providers searched for and loaded special plugins
  2014 CCS/the-web-never-forgets-persistent-tracking-mechanisms-in-the-wild
      canvas fingerprinting — more than 5.5% of crawled sites; 5542 of the top 100,000 sites
  2015 WWW/privaricator-deceiving-fingerprinters-with-little-white-lies
      Fingerprintable browser-property usage — 82.3% of scripts had 0 offsetHeight accesses; 1.87% had more than 50
  2015 WWW/privaricator-deceiving-fingerprinters-with-little-white-lies
      Fingerprinting resistance — 96.32% BlueCava; 78.36% fingerprintjs; 37.83% PetPortal; 78.81% Coinbase
  2016 CCS/online-tracking-a-1-million-site-measurement-and-analysis
      canvas fingerprinting — 14,371 sites (1.6%); 98.2% came from third-party scripts.
  2016 CCS/online-tracking-a-1-million-site-measurement-and-analysis
      canvas font fingerprinting — 3,250 first-party sites; 2.5% of the top 1,000.
  2016 CCS/online-tracking-a-1-million-site-measurement-and-analysis
      AudioContext fingerprinting — Two fingerprinting scripts utilizing the API were discovered.
  2016 CCS/online-tracking-a-1-million-site-measurement-and-analysis
      Battery API fingerprinting — Two fingerprinting scripts were identified.
  2016 PETS/near-optimal-fingerprinting-with-constraints
      Targeted fingerprint uniqueness — 96.15% of users had anonymity sets of at most 3 at s = 50
  2016 PETS/near-optimal-fingerprinting-with-constraints
      Font fingerprint uniqueness — 13,155 users (30.13%) were uniquely identified using 10 fonts
  2016 PETS/near-optimal-fingerprinting-with-constraints
      General fingerprint uniqueness — 19.02% of users were unique with 10 fonts and available screen size
  2016 USENIX/internet-jones-and-the-raiders-of-the-lost-trackers-an-archaeological-study-of-w
      fingerprint-related API use — use of two or more fingerprinting APIs rose over time
  2016 IEEE-SP/beauty-and-the-beast-diverting-modern-web-browsers-to-build-unique-browser-finge
      browser fingerprint uniqueness — 89.4% of 118,934 fingerprints
  2016 IEEE-SP/beauty-and-the-beast-diverting-modern-web-browsers-to-build-unique-browser-finge
      mobile browser fingerprinting — 81% of 13,105 mobile fingerprints
  2016 IEEE-SP/beauty-and-the-beast-diverting-modern-web-browsers-to-build-unique-browser-finge
      desktop browser fingerprinting — 90% of desktop fingerprints
  2016 IEEE-SP/beauty-and-the-beast-diverting-modern-web-browsers-to-build-unique-browser-finge
      canvas fingerprinting — 0.491 overall
  2016 IEEE-SP/cloak-of-visibility-detecting-when-machines-browse-a-different-web
      cloaking fingerprinting techniques — JavaScript support: 22.4% of search and 49.6% of ads
  2017 USENIX/a-privacy-analysis-of-cross-device-tracking
      device fingerprint uniqueness — 3 duplicate mobile fingerprints and 1 duplicate desktop fingerprint
  2017 USENIX/extension-breakdown-security-analysis-of-browsers-extension-resources-control-po
      extension-set device fingerprinting — 116 of 204 users, or 56.86%, had unique extension sets.
  2017 IEEE-SP/xhound-quantifying-the-fingerprintability-of-browser-extensions
      browser-extension fingerprintability — At least 9.2% on arbitrary domains and more than 16.6% on popular URLs among the top 10,000 Chrome extensions
  2017 IEEE-SP/xhound-quantifying-the-fingerprintability-of-browser-extensions
      user extension fingerprintability — 14.1% uniquely identifiable; 19.4% share fingerprints with 2–20 users
  2017 IEEE-SP/xhound-quantifying-the-fingerprintability-of-browser-extensions
      persistent extension fingerprintability — 88.0% of originally detectable extensions remained detectable
  2017 IEEE-SP/xhound-quantifying-the-fingerprintability-of-browser-extensions
      Firefox extension fingerprintability — 16% on at least one URL and 7.3% on any domain
  2017 IEEE-SP/xhound-quantifying-the-fingerprintability-of-browser-extensions
      extension-fingerprinting script performance — Less than one second with up to 20 installed extensions
  2018 CCS/clock-around-the-clock-time-based-device-fingerprinting
      Web fingerprint discrimination — CryptoFP achieved around 45% exactly unique fingerprints among 300 users
  2018 CCS/the-webs-sixth-sense-a-study-of-scripts-accessing-smartphone-sensors
      browser fingerprinting — 62.7% of motion-sensor scripts also fingerprinted
  2018 IEEE-SP/fp-stalker-tracking-browser-fingerprint-evolutions
      browser fingerprint evolution — 50% of browser instances changed fingerprints in less than 5 days; 80% in less than 10 days
  2018 IEEE-SP/fp-stalker-tracking-browser-fingerprint-evolutions
      browser fingerprint linkability — 54.48 consecutive days on average for the hybrid variant
  2018 IMC/how-tracking-companies-circumvented-ad-blockers-using-websockets
      browser fingerprinting — approximately 3.4% of WebSockets
  2018 USENIX/fp-scanner-the-privacy-implications-of-browser-fingerprint-inconsistencies
      browser fingerprint inconsistencies — FP-Scanner reaches accuracy 1.0 overall
  2018 WWW/hiding-in-the-crowd-an-analysis-of-the-effectiveness-of-browser-fingerprinting-a
      unique browser fingerprints — 33.6% of fingerprints were unique; 35.7% on personal computers and 18.5% on mobile devices
  2018 WWW/hiding-in-the-crowd-an-analysis-of-the-effectiveness-of-browser-fingerprinting-a
      fingerprint fragility — More than 85% of desktop/laptop fingerprints became unique after one change
  2019 IMC/tales-from-the-porn-a-comprehensive-privacy-analysis-of-the-web-porn-ecosystem
      canvas fingerprinting — 245 scripts in 315 websites; third-party services appeared in 4% of sites
  2019 WWW/evaluating-anti-fingerprinting-privacy-enhancing-technologies
      Fingerprint trackability — Tor Browser Bundle revealed under 3 bits of entropy in the hybrid evaluation
  2019 WWW/unnecessarily-identifiable-quantifying-the-fingerprintability-of-browser-extensi
      bloat-related fingerprintable side effects — 3,320 extensions, or 5.7% of all extensions
  2019 WWW/unnecessarily-identifiable-quantifying-the-fingerprintability-of-browser-extensi
      bloat-only fingerprintability — approximately 62% of fingerprintable extensions had at least one bloat-related side effect
  2019 WWW/unnecessarily-identifiable-quantifying-the-fingerprintability-of-browser-extensi
      unique bloat fingerprints — 61.2% had totally distinct fingerprints
  2020 NDSS/carnus-exploring-the-privacy-threats-of-browser-extension-fingerprinting
      web-accessible-resource extension fingerprinting — 25,866 extensions detected
  2020 NDSS/carnus-exploring-the-privacy-threats-of-browser-extension-fingerprinting
      DOM-based extension fingerprinting — 5,793 extensions detected
  2020 NDSS/carnus-exploring-the-privacy-threats-of-browser-extension-fingerprinting
      intra-browser communication fingerprinting — 450 extensions detected
  2020 NDSS/carnus-exploring-the-privacy-threats-of-browser-extension-fingerprinting
      extension HTTP-request fingerprinting — 859 extensions detected
  2020 NDSS/carnus-exploring-the-privacy-threats-of-browser-extension-fingerprinting
      fingerprintability under CloakX — 83.6%–87.92% remain identifiable
  2020 PETS/long-term-observation-on-browser-fingerprinting-users-trackability-and-perspecti
      browser fingerprint trackability — 64.6%-94.5% of users were trackable across evaluated feature sets
  2020 PETS/long-term-observation-on-browser-fingerprinting-users-trackability-and-perspecti
      fingerprint stability — 10.7-11.9 weeks when optimizing for stability
  2020 PETS/long-term-observation-on-browser-fingerprinting-users-trackability-and-perspecti
      user perceptions of fingerprinting — 99.1% agreed websites can recognize users
  2020 WWW/beyond-the-front-page-measuring-third-party-dynamics-in-the-field
      device fingerprinting — Device fingerprinting increased by 25% on subsites; 0.15% of landing pages contained the script.
  2020 WWW/the-representativeness-of-automated-web-crawls-as-a-surrogate-for-human-browsing
      browser fingerprinting — Around 12% of Trexa sites, mostly Canvas fingerprinting.
  2021 IEEE-SP/fingerprinting-the-fingerprinters-learning-to-detect-browser-fingerprinting-beha
      browser fingerprinting prevalence — 10.18% of Alexa top-100K websites
  2021 IEEE-SP/fingerprinting-the-fingerprinters-learning-to-detect-browser-fingerprinting-beha
      fingerprinting domains — 2,349 domains on the top 100K sites
  2021 IEEE-SP/fingerprinting-the-fingerprinters-learning-to-detect-browser-fingerprinting-beha
      fingerprinting script classification — 99.9% accuracy, 93.8% recall, and 93.1% precision
  2021 IEEE-SP/fingerprinting-the-fingerprinters-learning-to-detect-browser-fingerprinting-beha
      JavaScript API use by fingerprinters — 25 API-keyword clusters extracted
  2021 PETS/ml-cb-machine-learning-canvas-block
      canvas fingerprinting — 21,395 of 280,148 files leveraged canvas fingerprinting
  2021 PETS/ml-cb-machine-learning-canvas-block
      canvas fingerprinting — 11% at the time of the 2018 scrape
  2021 NDSS/tales-of-favicons-and-caches-persistent-tracking-in-modern-browsers
      fingerprint entropy — 16–24 bits commonly available across platforms
  2021 PETS/unveiling-web-fingerprinting-in-the-wild-via-code-mining-and-machine-learning
      web fingerprinting — 1.1% of JSWild scripts
  2021 PETS/unveiling-web-fingerprinting-in-the-wild-via-code-mining-and-machine-learning
      web fingerprinting — 4,544 scripts from 842 services
  2021 PETS/unveiling-web-fingerprinting-in-the-wild-via-code-mining-and-machine-learning
      unknown fingerprinters — 695 services were unknown to TrackerList
  2021 PETS/unveiling-web-fingerprinting-in-the-wild-via-code-mining-and-machine-learning
      fingerprinting API usage — Plug-in and MIME-type enumeration used by 85% of fingerprinting scripts
  2021 PETS/unveiling-web-fingerprinting-in-the-wild-via-code-mining-and-machine-learning
      canvas fingerprinting — 21% of fingerprinting scripts
  2021 PETS/unveiling-web-fingerprinting-in-the-wild-via-code-mining-and-machine-learning
      audio fingerprinting — 4% of fingerprinting scripts
  2021 USENIX/fingerprinting-in-style-detecting-browser-extensions-via-injected-style-sheets
      Unique CSS extension fingerprints — 4,446 extensions, or 3.8%, could be uniquely identified on any webpage
  2021 USENIX/fingerprinting-in-style-detecting-browser-extensions-via-injected-style-sheets
      CSS fingerprint persistence — 82.5% still remain fingerprintable despite their updates
  2021 USENIX/phishprint-evading-phishing-detection-crawlers-by-prior-profiling
      Advanced browser fingerprints — 204 distinct <F,C,W> fingerprints across 348,516 sessions
  2021 USENIX/phishprint-evading-phishing-detection-crawlers-by-prior-profiling
      Fingerprint specificity — Smallest comparison dataset contained 467,696 visitors
  2021 USENIX/security-analysis-of-the-democracy-live-online-voting-system
      Browser fingerprint collection — Online ballot return included a browser fingerprint.
  2021 WWW/cookie-swap-party-abusing-first-party-cookies-for-web-tracking
      fingerprinting-generated cookies — 3 cookies highly indicative of fingerprinting
  2021 WWW/user-tracking-in-the-post-cookie-era-how-websites-bypass-gdpr-consent-to-track-u
      browser fingerprinting — 336 websites (1.24%) in at least one consent action; 73.5% in all three cases
  2021 IEEE-SP/good-bot-bad-bot-characterizing-automated-browsing-activity
      application fingerprinting — 223,913 requests from 12,183 unique bot IP addresses
  2022 CCS/im-spartacus-no-im-spartacus-proactively-protecting-users-from-phishing-by-inten
      fingerprinting-based cloaking — 96.52% (2,831) of 2,933 phishing kits
  2022 IMC/your-speaker-or-my-snooper-measuring-the-effectiveness-of-web-audio-browser-fing
      Web Audio fingerprint stability — Dynamics Compressor produced one stable fingerprint for each of 2,093 users.
  2022 IMC/your-speaker-or-my-snooper-measuring-the-effectiveness-of-web-audio-browser-fing
      Fingerprint collation — Fingerprint match scores ranged from 0.9899 to 0.9978 for tested subset sizes.
  2022 IMC/your-speaker-or-my-snooper-measuring-the-effectiveness-of-web-audio-browser-fing
      Audio fingerprint diversity — The combined audio vectors yielded 95 distinct fingerprints among 2,093 users.
  2022 IMC/your-speaker-or-my-snooper-measuring-the-effectiveness-of-web-audio-browser-fing
      Additive fingerprinting value — Canvas + Audio increased normalized entropy by 9.6%; UA + Audio increased it by 9.7%.
  2022 NDSS/auto-draft-242
      browser fingerprint tracking — Tracking increased from 17.5 to 28 days for seven-day collection periods
  2022 NDSS/auto-draft-242
      cross-browser fingerprinting — 52.6%, 79.3%, and 89.7% for Edge, Opera, and Yandex
  2022 NDSS/drawn-apart-a-device-identification-technique-based-on-remote-gpu-fingerprinting
      browser fingerprint tracking — Tracking time increased from 17.5 days to 28 days for seven-day collection periods.
  2022 PETS/fp-radar-longitudinal-measurement-and-early-detection-of-browser-fingerprinting
      browser fingerprinting via web APIs — 1.16% in 2016 and 3.70% in 2018
  2022 PETS/fp-radar-longitudinal-measurement-and-early-detection-of-browser-fingerprinting
      previously unknown API fingerprinting — 44% of API keywords were still publicly undisclosed
  2022 PETS/fp-radar-longitudinal-measurement-and-early-detection-of-browser-fingerprinting
      fingerprinting API cluster — 61% of keywords in the fingerprinting cluster appeared in fingerprinting scripts
  2022 PETS/my-cookie-is-a-phoenix-detection-measurement-and-lawfulness-of-cookie-respawning
      cookie respawning with browser fingerprinting — 1,150 of 30,000 websites (3.83%)
  2022 PETS/my-cookie-is-a-phoenix-detection-measurement-and-lawfulness-of-cookie-respawning
      fingerprinting-feature dependency — 1,425 cookies depended on at least one studied feature
  2022 PETS/omnicrawl-comprehensive-measurement-of-web-tracking-with-real-desktop-and-mobile
      browser fingerprinting — Privacy-focused browsers showed 48% fewer WebGL Image and 44% fewer Canvas detections.
  2022 PETS/omnicrawl-comprehensive-measurement-of-web-tracking-with-real-desktop-and-mobile
      fingerprinting code reuse — 277 of 1,444 scripts, or 14%, contained all fingerprintjs2 magic strings.
  2022 USENIX/phish-in-sheeps-clothing-exploring-the-authentication-pitfalls-of-browser-finger
      browser fingerprinting on login pages — Basic fingerprinting was widespread; advanced techniques included canvas, fonts, WebRTC, and AudioContext.
  2022 USENIX/the-dangers-of-human-touch-fingerprinting-browser-extensions-through-user-action
      user-triggered extension fingerprinting — 4,971 unique extensions
  2022 USENIX/the-dangers-of-human-touch-fingerprinting-browser-extensions-through-user-action
      user-action-only fingerprintability — ≈64% can only be detected through user-driven interactions
  2022 WWW/beyond-bot-detection-combating-fraudulent-online-survey-takers
      browser-fingerprint duplication — 48 MTurk worker IDs contained duplicate fingerprints and were grouped into 14 groups.
  2022 WWW/investigating-advertisers-domain-changing-behaviors-and-their-impacts-on-ad-bloc
      browser fingerprinting — 142 of 395 labeled RAD domains (35.9%)
  2023 CCS/cookiegraph-understanding-and-detecting-first-party-tracking-cookies
      Fingerprinting scripts setting cookies — 1,908 out of 20K sites
  2023 NDSS/him-of-many-faces-characterizing-billion-scale-adversarial-and-benign-browser-fingerprints-on-commercial-websites
      adversarial versus benign browser fingerprints — 1.6% shared, 8.1% purely adversarial, and 90.3% purely benign
  2023 NDSS/him-of-many-faces-characterizing-billion-scale-adversarial-and-benign-browser-fingerprints-on-commercial-websites
      fingerprint evolution — Benign fingerprints increased from near one to more than 1.5 fingerprints per account; adversarial fingerprints stayed near one
  2023 NDSS/him-of-many-faces-characterizing-billion-scale-adversarial-and-benign-browser-fingerprints-on-commercial-websites
      adversarial fingerprint generation tools — Scripting tools accounted for over 80% of adversarial traffic
  2023 NDSS/him-of-many-faces-characterizing-billion-scale-adversarial-and-benign-browser-fingerprints-on-commercial-websites
      adversarial fingerprint strategies — Block+Randomize was the most common emulated-browser strategy, at 9.0% of adversarial requests
  2023 PETS/your-drm-can-watch-you-too-exploring-the-privacy-implications-of-browsers-mis-im
      Android Client ID fingerprint uniqueness — The certificate chain was unique for all Android devices in the test set.
  2023 PETS/your-drm-can-watch-you-too-exploring-the-privacy-implications-of-browsers-mis-im
      Client ID fingerprint stability — Android devices returned the same certificate over two years and shorter intervals.
  2023 USENIX/is-your-wallet-snitching-on-you-an-analysis-on-the-privacy-implications-of-web3
      wallet-enhanced browser fingerprinting — 878 scripts belonging to 1,099 websites
  2023 USENIX/one-size-does-not-fit-all-uncovering-and-exploiting-cross-platform-discrepant-ap
      Fingerprintable APIs — 13 APIs
  2023 USENIX/rods-with-laser-beams-understanding-browser-fingerprinting-on-phishing-pages
      browser fingerprinting — 18.7% (319,922) of 1,709,810 sites
  2023 USENIX/rods-with-laser-beams-understanding-browser-fingerprinting-on-phishing-pages
      fingerprinting over time — around 12% initially to over 26.6% in the last months
  2023 USENIX/rods-with-laser-beams-understanding-browser-fingerprinting-on-phishing-pages
      fingerprinting intention — 32.6% content manipulation; 31.6% harvesting; 35.8% both
  2023 USENIX/rods-with-laser-beams-understanding-browser-fingerprinting-on-phishing-pages
      fingerprinting API usage — 890,795 calls; 78.2% collect UserAgent; 6% use canvas
  2023 USENIX/rods-with-laser-beams-understanding-browser-fingerprinting-on-phishing-pages
      fingerprint harvesting — 81.3% (490) of clusters sent data in requests
  2023 USENIX/rods-with-laser-beams-understanding-browser-fingerprinting-on-phishing-pages
      target-page fingerprint matching — 29.1% of target login pages
  2023 WWW/automatic-discovery-of-emerging-browser-fingerprinting-techniques
      browser fingerprinting APIs — 231 fingerprinting APIs in the first crawl; 249 across two crawls
  2023 WWW/automatic-discovery-of-emerging-browser-fingerprinting-techniques
      emerging fingerprinting APIs — 18 additional fingerprinting APIs
  2023 WWW/automatic-discovery-of-emerging-browser-fingerprinting-techniques
      fingerprinting API detection coverage — 176 of 249 fingerprinting APIs
  2023 IEEE-SP/fashion-faux-pas-implicit-stylistic-fingerprints-for-bypassing-browsers-anti-fin
      stylistic browser fingerprinting — StylisticFP uniquely identified 534 of 866 filtered devices.
  2023 IEEE-SP/fashion-faux-pas-implicit-stylistic-fingerprints-for-bypassing-browsers-anti-fin
      fingerprint stability across visits — StylisticFP failed for 41 devices; FPJS failed for 188.
  2023 IEEE-SP/fashion-faux-pas-implicit-stylistic-fingerprints-for-bypassing-browsers-anti-fin
      fingerprint collisions — 95 StylisticFP collisions versus 55 for FPJS
  2023 IEEE-SP/fashion-faux-pas-implicit-stylistic-fingerprints-for-bypassing-browsers-anti-fin
      fingerprint feature entropy — Media-2 had the highest entropy, 0.58.
  2023 IEEE-SP/fashion-faux-pas-implicit-stylistic-fingerprints-for-bypassing-browsers-anti-fin
      fingerprinting performance overhead — Entire page loading was under one second in 98% of runs.
  2024 IMC/browser-polygraph-efficient-deployment-of-coarse-grained-browser-fingerprints-fo
      fraud browser fingerprints — 75–84% recall for GoLogin, Incogniton, and Octo Browser; 67% for Sphere
  2024 IMC/browser-polygraph-efficient-deployment-of-coarse-grained-browser-fingerprints-fo
      fingerprint uniqueness — 0.3% of fingerprints were unique
  2024 IMC/browser-polygraph-efficient-deployment-of-coarse-grained-browser-fingerprints-fo
      fingerprint response overhead — 6 ms response time and 1 KB storage
  2024 CCS/peeking-through-the-window-fingerprinting-browser-extensions-through-page-visibl
      Global-variable fingerprinting — 1,301 extensions uniquely identified by variables
  2024 CCS/peeking-through-the-window-fingerprinting-browser-extensions-through-page-visibl
      Storage-side-effect fingerprinting — 391 extensions uniquely identified through storage IndexedDB behavior
  2024 CCS/peeking-through-the-window-fingerprinting-browser-extensions-through-page-visibl
      postMessage fingerprinting — 737 of 1,028 deterministic-message extensions sent uniquely identifying messages
  2024 CCS/peeking-through-the-window-fingerprinting-browser-extensions-through-page-visibl
      Chrome extension fingerprintability — 2,747 of 3,398 behaviorally active extensions uniquely fingerprintable
  2024 CCS/peeking-through-the-window-fingerprinting-browser-extensions-through-page-visibl
      Firefox extension fingerprintability — 572 extensions
  2024 CCS/peeking-through-the-window-fingerprinting-browser-extensions-through-page-visibl
      Fingerprint persistence across visits — nine visits per extension
  2024 PETS/website-data-transparency-in-the-browser
      browser fingerprinting — F1 score 1.00 on seven test instances
  2024 NDSS/fp-fed-privacy-preserving-federated-detection-of-browser-fingerprinting
      Browser fingerprinting scripts — 752 of 181,633 scripts (0.41%)
  2024 NDSS/fp-fed-privacy-preserving-federated-detection-of-browser-fingerprinting
      Fingerprinting scripts missed by automated crawls — Manual crawling captured 3.07× more fingerprinting scripts than automated crawlers.
  2024 NDSS/fp-fed-privacy-preserving-federated-detection-of-browser-fingerprinting
      Fingerprinting detector performance — 0.86 AUPRC with 1M participants and ε = 1
  2024 PETS/fp-tracer-fine-grained-browser-fingerprinting-detection-via-taint-tracking-and-e
      browser fingerprinting flows — 269 784 fingerprinting flows and 15 239 unique browser attribute combinations
  2024 PETS/fp-tracer-fine-grained-browser-fingerprinting-detection-via-taint-tracking-and-e
      entropy-based fingerprinting severity — Very High 8.08%, High 61.49%, Medium 30.94%, Low 58.99%
  2024 PETS/fp-tracer-fine-grained-browser-fingerprinting-detection-via-taint-tracking-and-e
      audio fingerprinting — 54 crawled domains
  2024 PETS/fp-tracer-fine-grained-browser-fingerprinting-detection-via-taint-tracking-and-e
      canvas fingerprinting — 6237 crawled domains
  2024 PETS/fp-tracer-fine-grained-browser-fingerprinting-detection-via-taint-tracking-and-e
      storage fingerprinting — storageEstimate.quota detected in 148 domains
  2024 PETS/fp-tracer-fine-grained-browser-fingerprinting-detection-via-taint-tracking-and-e
      fingerprinting obfuscation — 46% of transmitted attributes in the most severe category
  2024 PETS/fp-tracer-fine-grained-browser-fingerprinting-detection-via-taint-tracking-and-e
      collaborative fingerprinting — 38% of fingerprinters involve two or more domains
  2024 USENIX/purl-safe-and-effective-sanitization-of-link-decoration
      fingerprinting information sharing — 200 of 1,800 decorations were labeled ATS
  2024 WWW/the-double-edged-sword-identifying-authentication-pages-and-their-fingerprinting
      browser fingerprinting — 9.2% of visited pages
  2024 WWW/the-double-edged-sword-identifying-authentication-pages-and-their-fingerprinting
      browser fingerprinting on authentication pages — 10.2% of login and sign-up pages
  2024 WWW/the-double-edged-sword-identifying-authentication-pages-and-their-fingerprinting
      Canvas fingerprinting — 93.10% of fingerprinting homepages
  2024 WWW/the-double-edged-sword-identifying-authentication-pages-and-their-fingerprinting
      tracking fingerprinting scripts — 50.50% on login pages and 55.65% on sign-up pages
  2024 WWW/the-double-edged-sword-identifying-authentication-pages-and-their-fingerprinting
      same third-party fingerprinting scripts — 505 of 515 domains (98.06%)
  2024 WWW/the-double-edged-sword-identifying-authentication-pages-and-their-fingerprinting
      fingerprinting blocked functionality — Disruptions observed on deezer.com and hepsiburada.com
  2024 WWW/panoptichrome-a-modern-in-browser-taint-analysis-framework
      fingerprinting APIs — 362 APIs probably used for fingerprinting or potentially misusable; 208 were previously unreported
  2024 IEEE-SP/targeted-and-troublesome-tracking-and-advertising-on-childrens-websites
      browser fingerprinting — 9% in Frankfurt and 10% in NYC desktop crawls
  2025 CCS/byte-by-byte-unmasking-browser-fingerprinting-at-the-function-level-using-v8-byt
      Browser fingerprinting functions — 4,670 unique fingerprinting functions after cleaning and deduplication
  2025 CCS/byte-by-byte-unmasking-browser-fingerprinting-at-the-function-level-using-v8-byt
      Browser fingerprinting scripts — 7,539 fingerprinting scripts after URL filtering
  2025 CCS/byte-by-byte-unmasking-browser-fingerprinting-at-the-function-level-using-v8-byt
      Fingerprinting-function detection overhead — 158.74 ms average, a 4% increase in median page-load time
  2025 CCS/local-frames-exploiting-inherited-origins-to-bypass-content-blockers
      fingerprinting in local frames — 4,280 websites
  2025 IMC/canvassing-the-fingerprinters-characterizing-canvas-fingerprinting-use-across-th
      canvas fingerprinting — 12.7% of 16,276 popular sites; 9.9% of 17,260 tail sites
  2025 IMC/canvassing-the-fingerprinters-characterizing-canvas-fingerprinting-use-across-th
      fingerprinting vendor reach — Akamai reached 485 popular and 205 tail sites; FingerprintJS reached 462 and 298
  2025 NDSS/cascading-spy-sheets-exploiting-the-complexity-of-modern-css-for-email-and-browser-fingerprinting
      font fingerprinting — 831 of 861 (96.5 %)
  2025 NDSS/cascading-spy-sheets-exploiting-the-complexity-of-modern-css-for-email-and-browser-fingerprinting
      CSS arithmetic fingerprinting — 1116 OS-browser combination pairs (94.9 %)
  2025 NDSS/cascading-spy-sheets-exploiting-the-complexity-of-modern-css-for-email-and-browser-fingerprinting
      browser-extension fingerprinting — all 10 tested extensions
  2025 NDSS/cascading-spy-sheets-exploiting-the-complexity-of-modern-css-for-email-and-browser-fingerprinting
      email-client fingerprinting — 8 of 21 clients (40 %)
  2025 PETS/how-unique-is-whose-web-browser-the-role-of-demographics-in-browser-fingerprinti
      browser fingerprint uniqueness — 60.2% of the 8,400 browser fingerprints were unique
  2025 PETS/how-unique-is-whose-web-browser-the-role-of-demographics-in-browser-fingerprinti
      demographic differences in fingerprinting risk — Lower-income and older groups showed greater fingerprinting risk
  2025 PETS/rethinking-fingerprinting-an-assessment-of-behavior-based-methods-at-scale-and-i
      behavioral fingerprint uniqueness — At 150,000 users, average anonymity was reduced by 94.6%.
  2025 PETS/rethinking-fingerprinting-an-assessment-of-behavior-based-methods-at-scale-and-i
      behavioral fingerprint consistency — F1 decreased from 0.571 to 0.339 over 540 days.
  2025 PETS/rethinking-fingerprinting-an-assessment-of-behavior-based-methods-at-scale-and-i
      combined behavioral and browser fingerprinting — Combined fingerprinting achieved F1 scores above 0.86 with weighted voting at scale.
  2025 USENIX/double-edged-shield-on-the-fingerprintability-of-customized-ad-blockers
      filter-list fingerprinting — 84% of filter lists identified
  2025 USENIX/double-edged-shield-on-the-fingerprintability-of-customized-ad-blockers
      ad-blocker configuration fingerprinting — 0.72 for ADGUARD
  2025 WWW/beyond-the-crawl-unmasking-browser-fingerprinting-in-real-user-interactions
      Browser fingerprinting scripts — 695 fingerprinting scripts in real-user sessions versus 498 in the automated crawl
  2025 WWW/beyond-the-crawl-unmasking-browser-fingerprinting-in-real-user-interactions
      Fingerprinting API vectors — Several Audio and WebRTC APIs had Call Ratio = ∞
  2025 WWW/beyond-the-crawl-unmasking-browser-fingerprinting-in-real-user-interactions
      Federated fingerprinting detection — AUPRC 0.98 at ε=1, 5, and 10 versus 0.96 for the centralized automated-crawl model
  2025 WWW/broken-access-on-the-challenges-of-screen-reader-assisted-two-factor-and-passwor
      browser-extension fingerprinting — ChromeVox and other listed extensions accurately detected
  2025 PETS/tracking-without-borders-studying-the-role-of-webviews-in-bridging-mobile-and-we
      Browser and canvas fingerprinting — Canvas fingerprinting observed in six apps across fraud detection, bot identification, and cross-platform tracking
  2025 PETS/unmasking-the-shadows-a-cross-country-study-of-online-tracking-in-illegal-movie
      Browser fingerprinting — over 70% across all analyzed countries; nearly 90% in Australia and Brazil
  2025 IMC/fp-inconsistent-measurement-and-analysis-of-fingerprint-inconsistencies-in-evasi
      fingerprint attribute evasion — 97.71% for BotD and 81.66% for DataDome
  2025 IMC/fp-inconsistent-measurement-and-analysis-of-fingerprint-inconsistencies-in-evasi
      spatial fingerprint inconsistencies — Combined rules raised detection to 76.88% for DataDome and 70.86% for BotD
  2025 IMC/fp-inconsistent-measurement-and-analysis-of-fingerprint-inconsistencies-in-evasi
      temporal fingerprint inconsistencies — Combined rules reduced evasion by 48.11% against DataDome and 44.95% against BotD
  2025 WWW/the-first-early-evidence-of-the-use-of-browser-fingerprinting-for-online-trackin
      fingerprinting-based ad tracking — Substantial bid-value differences after changing browser fingerprints.
  2025 WWW/the-first-early-evidence-of-the-use-of-browser-fingerprinting-for-online-trackin
      fingerprinting-based HTTP tracking — Fake fingerprints reduced HTTP chains to 6,345 versus more than 36,000 for true fingerprints.
  2025 WWW/the-first-early-evidence-of-the-use-of-browser-fingerprinting-for-online-trackin
      fingerprinting under privacy regulations — Potential fingerprint-based data sharing remained under selected GDPR and CCPA settings.
  2025 WWW/fp-rainbow-fingerprint-based-browser-configuration-identification
      browser configuration fingerprint identification — 84.36% for individual parameters and 78.15% for multiple switches
  2026 NDSS/cross-boundary-mobile-tracking-exploring-java-to-javascript-information-diffusion-in-webviews
      Fingerprinting API use — over 30% of exfiltrating apps invoked more than 50 fingerprinting APIs
  2026 NDSS/cross-boundary-mobile-tracking-exploring-java-to-javascript-information-diffusion-in-webviews
      Canvas fingerprinting — over 742 apps used WebGLRenderingContext.getExtension; 284 used canvas.toDataURL
  2026 PETS/an-improved-entropy-measure-for-web-browser-fingerprinting-risk
      Browser fingerprinting risk — The combined Fingerprint had 5,973 distinct values and 60.2% unique users.
  2026 PETS/the-masks-we-think-we-wear-privacy-threats-of-browser-extension-wallets-in-the-w
      wallet fingerprinting — 36 of 85 wallets (42.4%), covering 29.08 million users (82%)
  2026 PETS/analyzing-societal-awareness-and-perception-of-digital-fingerprinting-and-finger
      Awareness of digital fingerprinting — Mean fingerprinting awareness was 2.4 versus 2.86 for cookies.
  2026 PETS/analyzing-societal-awareness-and-perception-of-digital-fingerprinting-and-finger
      Acceptance of fingerprinting applications — Mean acceptance was 3.90 for cybersecurity, 3.73 for law enforcement, and 3.00 for user experience.
  2026 PETS/analyzing-societal-awareness-and-perception-of-digital-fingerprinting-and-finger
      Qualitative concerns about fingerprinting — Own-purpose concerns were 34.0% for cybersecurity, 17.4% for law enforcement, and 42.9% for user experience.
 
## Evidence quotes to spot-check (every 7th browser-FP tuple)
 
  NDSS/2012/host-fingerprinting-and-tracking-on-the-web-privacy-and-security-implications  [results]
      Browser fingerprint entropy: "In our data, UA has an entropy of 11.59 bits, while the entropy of UA+IP is 20.29 bits."
 
  WWW/2015/privaricator-deceiving-fingerprinters-with-little-white-lies  [methodology]
      Fingerprintable browser-property usage: "Overall, 82.3% of scripts have 0 accesses to offsetHeight. However, 1.87% of scripts have more than 50 accesses when visited at runtime."
 
  PETS/2016/near-optimal-fingerprinting-with-constraints  [results]
      Font fingerprint uniqueness: "Detection of 10 fonts allows unique identification of 13, 155 users in our datasets (30.13%)"
 
  IEEE-SP/2018/fp-stalker-tracking-browser-fingerprint-evolutions  [results]
      browser fingerprint evolution: "50 % of browser instances changed their fingerprints in less than 5 days, 80 % in less than 10 days"
 
  WWW/2019/evaluating-anti-fingerprinting-privacy-enhancing-technologies  [results]
      Fingerprint trackability: "It finds Tor Browser Bundle (Tor BB) to be most effective, revealing under 3 bits of entropy."
 
  NDSS/2020/carnus-exploring-the-privacy-threats-of-browser-extension-fingerprinting  [methodology]
      extension HTTP-request fingerprinting: "we obtain all resources requested by the web page and content scripts of extensions installed in the user's browser."
 
  IEEE-SP/2021/fingerprinting-the-fingerprinters-learning-to-detect-browser-fingerprinting-beha  [results]
      browser fingerprinting prevalence: "Overall, we find that more than 10.18% of top-100K websites deploy fingerprinting."
 
  PETS/2021/unveiling-web-fingerprinting-in-the-wild-via-code-mining-and-machine-learning  [results]
      web fingerprinting: "Only 1.1% of scripts is classified as actual fingerprinting."
 
  USENIX/2021/fingerprinting-in-style-detecting-browser-extensions-via-injected-style-sheets  [results]
      CSS fingerprint persistence: "after re-running our testing pipeline, 776 triggered at least one of their previously discovered triggers. In other words, 82.5% still remain fingerprintable despite their updates."
 
  CCS/2022/im-spartacus-no-im-spartacus-proactively-protecting-users-from-phishing-by-inten  [results]
      fingerprinting-based cloaking: "In total, 96.52% (2,831) out of 2,933 phishing kits contain fingerprinting-based cloaking techniques."
 
  NDSS/2022/drawn-apart-a-device-identification-technique-based-on-remote-gpu-fingerprinting  [results]
      browser fingerprint tracking: "adding D RAWN A PART to FP-S TALKER increases the tracking time, raising the median average tracking time by 10.5 days, from 17.5 days to 28 days."
 
  PETS/2022/omnicrawl-comprehensive-measurement-of-web-tracking-with-real-desktop-and-mobile  [results]
      fingerprinting code reuse: "out of the 1444 unique scripts that match at least one fingerprinting category, 277 (14%) contain all the magic strings of fingerprintjs2"
 
  NDSS/2023/him-of-many-faces-characterizing-billion-scale-adversarial-and-benign-browser-fingerprints-on-commercial-websites  [results]
      adversarial versus benign browser fingerprints: "Only 1.6% of unique fingerprints are shared between adversarial and benign; by contrast, 8.1% are purely adversarial and 90.3% purely benign."
 
  USENIX/2023/is-your-wallet-snitching-on-you-an-analysis-on-the-privacy-implications-of-web3  [results]
      wallet-enhanced browser fingerprinting: "we find that 878 scripts (79%) belonging to 1, 099 websites (83%) engage in browser fingerprinting and leverage wallet information to enhance the fingerprints they generate."
 
  USENIX/2023/rods-with-laser-beams-understanding-browser-fingerprinting-on-phishing-pages  [results]
      fingerprinting intention: "104, 279 (32.6%) ... use it for content manipulation, and 101, 030 (31.6%) ... shares them ... Finally, 114, 613 (35.8%) use fingerprinting for both intentions."
 
  CCS/2024/peeking-through-the-window-fingerprinting-browser-extensions-through-page-visibl  [results]
      Chrome extension fingerprintability: "Out of those, we can uniquely identify 2,747."
 
  NDSS/2024/fp-fed-privacy-preserving-federated-detection-of-browser-fingerprinting  [dataset]
      Browser fingerprinting scripts: "According to our high-precision ground-truth heuristic, 752 out of the 181,633 scripts (0.41%) are fingerprinting."
 
  PETS/2024/fp-tracer-fine-grained-browser-fingerprinting-detection-via-taint-tracking-and-e  [results]
      storage fingerprinting: "We detected storageEstimate.quota in 148 domains."
 
  WWW/2024/the-double-edged-sword-identifying-authentication-pages-and-their-fingerprinting  [results]
      tracking fingerprinting scripts: "home pages have the highest rate of tracking at 61.46%, compared to login pages at 50.50% and sign-up pages at 55.65%."
 
  CCS/2025/local-frames-exploiting-inherited-origins-to-bypass-content-blockers  [results]
      fingerprinting in local frames: "Approximately a third (4,280) of all websites containing local frames use them to perform fingerprinting, a clear privacy concern."
 
  PETS/2025/how-unique-is-whose-web-browser-the-role-of-demographics-in-browser-fingerprinti  [results]
      browser fingerprint uniqueness: "Approximately 60% of users in our dataset have a unique overall Fingerprint."
 
  WWW/2025/beyond-the-crawl-unmasking-browser-fingerprinting-in-real-user-interactions  [results]
      Browser fingerprinting scripts: "out of these collected scripts, 695 were found to be fingerprinting in the real user browsing sessions, compared to only 498 in the automated crawl."
 
  PETS/2026/analyzing-societal-awareness-and-perception-of-digital-fingerprinting-and-finger  [results]
      Awareness of digital fingerprinting: "We observed an overall mean awareness level of 2.86 ... and 2.4 ... respectively (min: 1 - max: 4)."
 
  IEEE-SP/2016/beauty-and-the-beast-diverting-modern-web-browsers-to-build-unique-browser-finge  [results]
      canvas fingerprinting: "Alone, as a simple rendered picture, the normalized entropy is at 0.491, putting it in the top 5 of the most discriminating attributes."
 
  WWW/2025/the-first-early-evidence-of-the-use-of-browser-fingerprinting-for-online-trackin  [results]
      fingerprinting-based ad tracking: "When comparing "True FP True IP" to "Fake FP True IP," in Table 2, there are substantial differences in median and maximum bid values."
 
  IEEE-SP/2017/xhound-quantifying-the-fingerprintability-of-browser-extensions  [results]
      persistent extension fingerprintability: "Among the extensions that were originally fingerprintable, approximately 38% were updated and, overall, 88% of them remained fingerprintable."
 
  IEEE-SP/2023/fashion-faux-pas-implicit-stylistic-fingerprints-for-bypassing-browsers-anti-fin  [evaluation]
      fingerprinting performance overhead: "our approach is stable and the entire page's loading time is less than 1 second in 98% of the runs."
 
 
## Legal and human-subjects angles
 
10 of 83 browser-FP papers assess a law (corpus-wide: 402 of 5859).
Law                                             Papers
----------------------------------------------  ------
GDPR                                            9
ePrivacy Directive                              3
CCPA                                            3
European directives 2002/58/CE and 2009/136/CE  1
ePrivacy directive                              1
Digital Economy Act 2017                        1
LGPD                                            1
COPPA                                           1
Digital Services Act                            1
  WWW/2018/hiding-in-the-crowd-an-analysis-of-the-effectiveness-of-browser-fingerprinting-a  European directives 2002/58/CE and 2009/136/CE: Consent for cookies and browser fingerprinting collection
  IMC/2019/tales-from-the-porn-a-comprehensive-privacy-analysis-of-the-web-porn-ecosystem  GDPR: Tracking, cookie consent, privacy policies, and HTTPS
  IMC/2019/tales-from-the-porn-a-comprehensive-privacy-analysis-of-the-web-porn-ecosystem  ePrivacy directive: Cookie-consent banners before cookie use
  IMC/2019/tales-from-the-porn-a-comprehensive-privacy-analysis-of-the-web-porn-ecosystem  Digital Economy Act 2017: Verifiable age-verification mechanisms
  WWW/2020/beyond-the-front-page-measuring-third-party-dynamics-in-the-field  GDPR: Third-party connections to potentially inadequate countries
  PETS/2021/unveiling-web-fingerprinting-in-the-wild-via-code-mining-and-machine-learning  GDPR: Data-collection privacy and protection procedures
  WWW/2021/user-tracking-in-the-post-cookie-era-how-websites-bypass-gdpr-consent-to-track-u  GDPR: Tracking and personal-data processing after consent choices
  WWW/2021/user-tracking-in-the-post-cookie-era-how-websites-bypass-gdpr-consent-to-track-u  ePrivacy Directive: Compliance of tracking mechanisms with privacy rules
  PETS/2022/my-cookie-is-a-phoenix-detection-measurement-and-lawfulness-of-cookie-respawning  GDPR: Fairness, transparency, lawfulness, and consent for respawned cookies
  PETS/2022/my-cookie-is-a-phoenix-detection-measurement-and-lawfulness-of-cookie-respawning  ePrivacy Directive: Consent requirements for cookie-based processing
  NDSS/2023/him-of-many-faces-characterizing-billion-scale-adversarial-and-benign-browser-fingerprints-on-commercial-websites  GDPR: Secure processing of collected personal data
  NDSS/2023/him-of-many-faces-characterizing-billion-scale-adversarial-and-benign-browser-fingerprints-on-commercial-websites  CCPA: Secure processing of collected personal data
  PETS/2025/unmasking-the-shadows-a-cross-country-study-of-online-tracking-in-illegal-movie  GDPR: Differences in tracking across GDPR-country vantage points
  PETS/2025/unmasking-the-shadows-a-cross-country-study-of-online-tracking-in-illegal-movie  CCPA: Tracking measurements from a CCPA-covered vantage point
  PETS/2025/unmasking-the-shadows-a-cross-country-study-of-online-tracking-in-illegal-movie  LGPD: Tracking measurements from an LGPD-covered vantage point
  WWW/2025/the-first-early-evidence-of-the-use-of-browser-fingerprinting-for-online-trackin  GDPR: Fingerprint-based data sharing after consent opt-out and opt-in.
  WWW/2025/the-first-early-evidence-of-the-use-of-browser-fingerprinting-for-online-trackin  CCPA: Fingerprint-based data sharing after consent opt-out and opt-in.
  IEEE-SP/2024/targeted-and-troublesome-tracking-and-advertising-on-childrens-websites  GDPR: Tracking and targeted advertising consent requirements
  IEEE-SP/2024/targeted-and-troublesome-tracking-and-advertising-on-childrens-websites  ePrivacy Directive: Consent before tracking cookies or similar technologies
  IEEE-SP/2024/targeted-and-troublesome-tracking-and-advertising-on-childrens-websites  COPPA: Parental consent for child-directed targeted advertising
  IEEE-SP/2024/targeted-and-troublesome-tracking-and-advertising-on-childrens-websites  Digital Services Act: Behavioral advertising to minors
 
19 of 83 recruited human participants:
  USENIX/2017/a-privacy-analysis-of-cross-device-tracking  n=126  not-stated
  USENIX/2017/extension-breakdown-security-analysis-of-browsers-extension-resources-control-po  n=204  snowball
  CCS/2018/clock-around-the-clock-time-based-device-fingerprinting  n=565  snowball
  IEEE-SP/2018/fp-stalker-tracking-browser-fingerprint-evolutions  n=1905  not-stated
  PETS/2020/long-term-observation-on-browser-fingerprinting-users-trackability-and-perspecti  n=2315/1275/243  professional-network/professional-network/professional-network
  WWW/2020/the-representativeness-of-automated-web-crawls-as-a-surrogate-for-human-browsing  n=52000  not-stated
  PETS/2021/unveiling-web-fingerprinting-in-the-wild-via-code-mining-and-machine-learning  n=982  other-crowd-platform
  USENIX/2021/phishprint-evading-phishing-detection-crawlers-by-prior-profiling  n=1150/1007  mechanical-turk/mechanical-turk
  CCS/2022/im-spartacus-no-im-spartacus-proactively-protecting-users-from-phishing-by-inten  n=  not-stated
  IMC/2022/your-speaker-or-my-snooper-measuring-the-effectiveness-of-web-audio-browser-fing  n=2064/29  mechanical-turk/not-stated
  NDSS/2022/drawn-apart-a-device-identification-technique-based-on-remote-gpu-fingerprinting  n=  not-stated
  WWW/2022/beyond-bot-detection-combating-fraudulent-online-survey-takers  n=289/162  social-media/mechanical-turk
  PETS/2024/website-data-transparency-in-the-browser  n=100  prolific
  PETS/2025/how-unique-is-whose-web-browser-the-role-of-demographics-in-browser-fingerprinti  n=12461  prolific
  WWW/2025/beyond-the-crawl-unmasking-browser-fingerprinting-in-real-user-interactions  n=30  mechanical-turk
  PETS/2026/analyzing-societal-awareness-and-perception-of-digital-fingerprinting-and-finger  n=261/473  other-crowd-platform/university-pool
  IMC/2025/fp-inconsistent-measurement-and-analysis-of-fingerprint-inconsistencies-in-evasi  n=  university-pool
  IEEE-SP/2017/xhound-quantifying-the-fingerprintability-of-browser-extensions  n=51/509/294  professional-network/mechanical-turk/university-pool
  IEEE-SP/2023/fashion-faux-pas-implicit-stylistic-fingerprints-for-bypassing-browsers-anti-fin  n=  professional-network
 
## Browser-FP papers, newest first (for citation picking)
 
  2026 NDSS     cross-boundary-mobile-tracking-exploring-java-to-javascript-information-diffusion-in-webviews
      Fingerprinting API use; Canvas fingerprinting
  2026 PETS     an-improved-entropy-measure-for-web-browser-fingerprinting-risk
      Browser fingerprinting risk
  2026 PETS     the-masks-we-think-we-wear-privacy-threats-of-browser-extension-wallets-in-the-w
      wallet fingerprinting
  2026 PETS     analyzing-societal-awareness-and-perception-of-digital-fingerprinting-and-finger
      Awareness of digital fingerprinting; Acceptance of fingerprinting applications; Qualitative concerns about fingerprinting
  2025 CCS      byte-by-byte-unmasking-browser-fingerprinting-at-the-function-level-using-v8-byt
      Browser fingerprinting functions; Browser fingerprinting scripts; Fingerprinting-function detection overhead
  2025 CCS      local-frames-exploiting-inherited-origins-to-bypass-content-blockers
      fingerprinting in local frames
  2025 IMC      canvassing-the-fingerprinters-characterizing-canvas-fingerprinting-use-across-th
      canvas fingerprinting; fingerprinting vendor reach
  2025 IMC      fp-inconsistent-measurement-and-analysis-of-fingerprint-inconsistencies-in-evasi
      fingerprint attribute evasion; spatial fingerprint inconsistencies; temporal fingerprint inconsistencies
  2025 NDSS     cascading-spy-sheets-exploiting-the-complexity-of-modern-css-for-email-and-browser-fingerprinting
      font fingerprinting; CSS arithmetic fingerprinting; browser-extension fingerprinting; email-client fingerprinting
  2025 PETS     how-unique-is-whose-web-browser-the-role-of-demographics-in-browser-fingerprinti
      browser fingerprint uniqueness; demographic differences in fingerprinting risk
  2025 PETS     rethinking-fingerprinting-an-assessment-of-behavior-based-methods-at-scale-and-i
      behavioral fingerprint uniqueness; behavioral fingerprint consistency; combined behavioral and browser fingerprinting
  2025 PETS     tracking-without-borders-studying-the-role-of-webviews-in-bridging-mobile-and-we
      Browser and canvas fingerprinting
  2025 PETS     unmasking-the-shadows-a-cross-country-study-of-online-tracking-in-illegal-movie
      Browser fingerprinting
  2025 USENIX   double-edged-shield-on-the-fingerprintability-of-customized-ad-blockers
      filter-list fingerprinting; ad-blocker configuration fingerprinting
  2025 WWW      beyond-the-crawl-unmasking-browser-fingerprinting-in-real-user-interactions
      Browser fingerprinting scripts; Fingerprinting API vectors; Federated fingerprinting detection
  2025 WWW      broken-access-on-the-challenges-of-screen-reader-assisted-two-factor-and-passwor
      browser-extension fingerprinting
  2025 WWW      the-first-early-evidence-of-the-use-of-browser-fingerprinting-for-online-trackin
      fingerprinting-based ad tracking; fingerprinting-based HTTP tracking; fingerprinting under privacy regulations
  2025 WWW      fp-rainbow-fingerprint-based-browser-configuration-identification
      browser configuration fingerprint identification
  2024 CCS      peeking-through-the-window-fingerprinting-browser-extensions-through-page-visibl
      Global-variable fingerprinting; Storage-side-effect fingerprinting; postMessage fingerprinting; Chrome extension fingerprintability; Firefox extension fingerprintability; Fingerprint persistence across visits
  2024 IEEE-SP  targeted-and-troublesome-tracking-and-advertising-on-childrens-websites
      browser fingerprinting
  2024 IMC      browser-polygraph-efficient-deployment-of-coarse-grained-browser-fingerprints-fo
      fraud browser fingerprints; fingerprint uniqueness; fingerprint response overhead
  2024 NDSS     fp-fed-privacy-preserving-federated-detection-of-browser-fingerprinting
      Browser fingerprinting scripts; Fingerprinting scripts missed by automated crawls; Fingerprinting detector performance
  2024 PETS     website-data-transparency-in-the-browser
      browser fingerprinting
  2024 PETS     fp-tracer-fine-grained-browser-fingerprinting-detection-via-taint-tracking-and-e
      browser fingerprinting flows; entropy-based fingerprinting severity; audio fingerprinting; canvas fingerprinting; storage fingerprinting; fingerprinting obfuscation; collaborative fingerprinting
  2024 USENIX   purl-safe-and-effective-sanitization-of-link-decoration
      fingerprinting information sharing
  2024 WWW      the-double-edged-sword-identifying-authentication-pages-and-their-fingerprinting
      browser fingerprinting; browser fingerprinting on authentication pages; Canvas fingerprinting; tracking fingerprinting scripts; same third-party fingerprinting scripts; fingerprinting blocked functionality
  2024 WWW      panoptichrome-a-modern-in-browser-taint-analysis-framework
      fingerprinting APIs
  2023 CCS      cookiegraph-understanding-and-detecting-first-party-tracking-cookies
      Fingerprinting scripts setting cookies
  2023 IEEE-SP  fashion-faux-pas-implicit-stylistic-fingerprints-for-bypassing-browsers-anti-fin
      stylistic browser fingerprinting; fingerprint stability across visits; fingerprint collisions; fingerprint feature entropy; fingerprinting performance overhead
  2023 NDSS     him-of-many-faces-characterizing-billion-scale-adversarial-and-benign-browser-fingerprints-on-commercial-websites
      adversarial versus benign browser fingerprints; fingerprint distribution differences; fingerprint evolution; adversarial fingerprint generation tools; adversarial fingerprint strategies
  2023 PETS     your-drm-can-watch-you-too-exploring-the-privacy-implications-of-browsers-mis-im
      Android Client ID fingerprint uniqueness; Client ID fingerprint stability
  2023 USENIX   is-your-wallet-snitching-on-you-an-analysis-on-the-privacy-implications-of-web3
      wallet-enhanced browser fingerprinting
  2023 USENIX   one-size-does-not-fit-all-uncovering-and-exploiting-cross-platform-discrepant-ap
      Fingerprintable APIs
  2023 USENIX   rods-with-laser-beams-understanding-browser-fingerprinting-on-phishing-pages
      browser fingerprinting; fingerprinting over time; fingerprinting intention; fingerprinting API usage; fingerprint harvesting; target-page fingerprint matching
  2023 WWW      automatic-discovery-of-emerging-browser-fingerprinting-techniques
      browser fingerprinting APIs; emerging fingerprinting APIs; fingerprinting API detection coverage
  2022 CCS      privacy-limitations-of-interest-based-advertising-on-the-web-a-post-mortem-empir
      fingerprinting-enhanced cohort unicity
  2022 CCS      im-spartacus-no-im-spartacus-proactively-protecting-users-from-phishing-by-inten
      fingerprinting-based cloaking
  2022 IMC      your-speaker-or-my-snooper-measuring-the-effectiveness-of-web-audio-browser-fing
      Web Audio fingerprint stability; Fingerprint collation; Audio fingerprint diversity; Additive fingerprinting value
  2022 NDSS     auto-draft-242
      browser fingerprint tracking; cross-browser fingerprinting
  2022 NDSS     drawn-apart-a-device-identification-technique-based-on-remote-gpu-fingerprinting
      browser fingerprint tracking
  2022 PETS     fp-radar-longitudinal-measurement-and-early-detection-of-browser-fingerprinting
      browser fingerprinting via web APIs; previously unknown API fingerprinting; fingerprinting API cluster
  2022 PETS     my-cookie-is-a-phoenix-detection-measurement-and-lawfulness-of-cookie-respawning
      cookie respawning with browser fingerprinting; fingerprinting-feature dependency
  2022 PETS     omnicrawl-comprehensive-measurement-of-web-tracking-with-real-desktop-and-mobile
      browser fingerprinting; fingerprinting code reuse
  2022 USENIX   phish-in-sheeps-clothing-exploring-the-authentication-pitfalls-of-browser-finger
      browser fingerprinting on login pages
  2022 USENIX   the-dangers-of-human-touch-fingerprinting-browser-extensions-through-user-action
      user-triggered extension fingerprinting; user-action-only fingerprintability
  2022 WWW      beyond-bot-detection-combating-fraudulent-online-survey-takers
      browser-fingerprint duplication
  2022 WWW      investigating-advertisers-domain-changing-behaviors-and-their-impacts-on-ad-bloc
      browser fingerprinting
  2021 IEEE-SP  fingerprinting-the-fingerprinters-learning-to-detect-browser-fingerprinting-beha
      browser fingerprinting prevalence; fingerprinting domains; fingerprinting script classification; JavaScript API use by fingerprinters
  2021 IEEE-SP  good-bot-bad-bot-characterizing-automated-browsing-activity
      application fingerprinting
  2021 NDSS     tales-of-favicons-and-caches-persistent-tracking-in-modern-browsers
      fingerprint entropy
  2021 PETS     ml-cb-machine-learning-canvas-block
      canvas fingerprinting
  2021 PETS     unveiling-web-fingerprinting-in-the-wild-via-code-mining-and-machine-learning
      web fingerprinting; unknown fingerprinters; fingerprinting API usage; canvas fingerprinting; audio fingerprinting
  2021 USENIX   fingerprinting-in-style-detecting-browser-extensions-via-injected-style-sheets
      Unique CSS extension fingerprints; CSS fingerprint persistence
  2021 USENIX   phishprint-evading-phishing-detection-crawlers-by-prior-profiling
      Advanced browser fingerprints; Fingerprint specificity
  2021 USENIX   security-analysis-of-the-democracy-live-online-voting-system
      Browser fingerprint collection
  2021 WWW      cookie-swap-party-abusing-first-party-cookies-for-web-tracking
      fingerprinting-generated cookies
  2021 WWW      user-tracking-in-the-post-cookie-era-how-websites-bypass-gdpr-consent-to-track-u
      browser fingerprinting
  2020 NDSS     carnus-exploring-the-privacy-threats-of-browser-extension-fingerprinting
      web-accessible-resource extension fingerprinting; DOM-based extension fingerprinting; intra-browser communication fingerprinting; extension HTTP-request fingerprinting; fingerprintability under CloakX
  2020 PETS     long-term-observation-on-browser-fingerprinting-users-trackability-and-perspecti
      browser fingerprint trackability; fingerprint stability; user perceptions of fingerprinting
  2020 WWW      beyond-the-front-page-measuring-third-party-dynamics-in-the-field
      device fingerprinting
  2020 WWW      the-representativeness-of-automated-web-crawls-as-a-surrogate-for-human-browsing
      browser fingerprinting
  2019 IMC      tales-from-the-porn-a-comprehensive-privacy-analysis-of-the-web-porn-ecosystem
      canvas fingerprinting
  2019 WWW      evaluating-anti-fingerprinting-privacy-enhancing-technologies
      Fingerprint trackability
  2019 WWW      unnecessarily-identifiable-quantifying-the-fingerprintability-of-browser-extensi
      bloat-related fingerprintable side effects; bloat-only fingerprintability; unique bloat fingerprints
  2018 CCS      clock-around-the-clock-time-based-device-fingerprinting
      Web fingerprint discrimination
  2018 CCS      the-webs-sixth-sense-a-study-of-scripts-accessing-smartphone-sensors
      browser fingerprinting
  2018 IEEE-SP  fp-stalker-tracking-browser-fingerprint-evolutions
      browser fingerprint evolution; browser fingerprint linkability
  2018 IMC      how-tracking-companies-circumvented-ad-blockers-using-websockets
      browser fingerprinting
  2018 USENIX   fp-scanner-the-privacy-implications-of-browser-fingerprint-inconsistencies
      browser fingerprint inconsistencies
  2018 WWW      hiding-in-the-crowd-an-analysis-of-the-effectiveness-of-browser-fingerprinting-a
      unique browser fingerprints; fingerprint fragility
  2017 IEEE-SP  xhound-quantifying-the-fingerprintability-of-browser-extensions
      browser-extension fingerprintability; user extension fingerprintability; persistent extension fingerprintability; Firefox extension fingerprintability; extension-fingerprinting script performance
  2017 USENIX   a-privacy-analysis-of-cross-device-tracking
      device fingerprint uniqueness
  2017 USENIX   extension-breakdown-security-analysis-of-browsers-extension-resources-control-po
      extension-set device fingerprinting
  2016 CCS      online-tracking-a-1-million-site-measurement-and-analysis
      canvas fingerprinting; canvas font fingerprinting; AudioContext fingerprinting; Battery API fingerprinting
  2016 IEEE-SP  beauty-and-the-beast-diverting-modern-web-browsers-to-build-unique-browser-finge
      browser fingerprint uniqueness; mobile browser fingerprinting; desktop browser fingerprinting; canvas fingerprinting; WebGL fingerprinting
  2016 IEEE-SP  cloak-of-visibility-detecting-when-machines-browse-a-different-web
      cloaking fingerprinting techniques
  2016 PETS     near-optimal-fingerprinting-with-constraints
      Targeted fingerprint uniqueness; Font fingerprint uniqueness; General fingerprint uniqueness
  2016 USENIX   internet-jones-and-the-raiders-of-the-lost-trackers-an-archaeological-study-of-w
      fingerprint-related API use
  2015 WWW      privaricator-deceiving-fingerprinters-with-little-white-lies
      Fingerprintable browser-property usage; Fingerprinting resistance
  2014 CCS      the-web-never-forgets-persistent-tracking-mechanisms-in-the-wild
      canvas fingerprinting
  2013 CCS      performance-signatures-of-mobile-phone-browsers
      mobile browser performance fingerprinting
  2013 IEEE-SP  cookieless-monster-exploring-the-ecosystem-of-web-based-device-fingerprinting
      commercial web fingerprinting adoption; browser-family fingerprinting; browser-version fingerprinting; system fingerprinting plugins
  2012 NDSS     host-fingerprinting-and-tracking-on-the-web-privacy-and-security-implications
      Browser fingerprint entropy

• fouad2022my was one of two keys for the same paper in bibliography. The wiki-wide consolidation of 2026-09-04 (drain item dedup-regional-filter-lists-bibkey) kept fouad2022_cookie and deleted the other entry.
• 2 citation markers on fingerprinting were repointed to the kept key. No prose on either page changed, and no figure moved. Statements above that name the deleted key describe the state when they were written. Full query log and the invariants checked before saving: bibliography.

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