Working log behind Notifying websites. Every query with its denominator, the report script and its unedited output, the folding rules with their residue, the quotes that were spot-checked, the external sources that were verified and the ones that were rejected, and what could not be established. Corpus-wide caveats are on Corpus and are not restated here.

Not prose. Read it if you are checking a number.

The item as specified pointed at ethics.notifiedAffectedParties and ethics.harmMitigation and asked for “how to reach an operator at scale, response rates reported in the literature, and the disclosure-timeline conventions”. Three judgement calls:

• Scope excludes one-off coordinated disclosure to a named vendor. That is a queue with an SLA and nothing on this page would help. The page says so in its second paragraph. The consequence is that a large share of the 1,636 notifiedAffectedParties == yes papers are out of scope for the how-to part while remaining in scope for the how often part; the page keeps those two questions in separate sections rather than pooling them.
• Scope includes network-scanning campaigns, not only web ones. The page is titled “Notifying Websites” but 13 of the 32 hand-classified campaigns notified network operators and 6 notified app or skill developers rather than site owners (10 of 22 and 2 of 22 on 2026-08-13), and the methodological literature (control groups, channel comparison, decay curves, the one RCT) is disproportionately on that side. Excluding it would have produced a page with three campaigns on it. The page states which population each figure comes from. A reasonable person would have narrowed this to web only and produced a thinner, more on-title page.
• Not broadening a neighbour. Ethics exists but is 2.6 kB of bullet-point notes covering crawling harm, robots.txt and ethics approval. Notification is one line in its outline. Broadening it would have buried a 30 kB page inside a stub on a different topic. The two pages cross-link instead.

All figures from scripts/report_notifying_websites.mjs. Denominators, in the order the page uses them:

The old task hint (notifiedAffectedParties stated by 40.9%, harmMitigation by 57.4%, of 3,814 empirical papers) was computed on the 4,322-paper corpus and is superseded in both numerator and denominator. No figure was carried over.

Run as node scripts/report_notifying_websites.mjs. Flags: –wiki for DokuWiki tables, –list for the hand-classified campaigns and every rejection with its reason, –quotes for ethics evidence quotes, –residue for every unmapped fold entry and every unreviewed candidate (none, as of 2026-09-04). The block below is the unedited output of a fresh run on 2026-09-04 (out/notifying_websites-output-20260904.txt); sections A–D are byte-identical to the 2026-08-13 run, section E changed.

Sections of the script, so a figure on the content page can be traced to the block that produced it:

• A — ethics.notifiedAffectedParties by value and by population
• B — four-year buckets: notification, silence, disclosure detail, harm mitigation, regulator contact
• C — ethics.regulatorContact; ethics.harmMitigation folded into families with residue
• D — ethics.disclosureDetail folded into channel and outcome families with residue, plus every entry carrying a countable ratio
• E — full-text candidate scan (narrow rule and, since 2026-09-04, the wide recall probe), hand classification, and the unreviewed residue
• F — (–quotes) ethics evidence quotes for web papers with notifiedAffectedParties == yes

corpus: 5859 extraction records, 7 venues, 2010–2026
populations: empirical 5118 | empirical with an ethics record 4472 (87.4%) | crawled 1120 (with ethics record 992) | network-scan 930 (with ethics record 858)

==========================================================================
A. HOW OFTEN THE FIELD SAYS IT NOTIFIED ANYONE
==========================================================================

-- ethics.notifiedAffectedParties, of 4472 empirical papers with an ethics record --
Value           Papers  Share
--------------  ------  -----
yes             1636    36.6%
partial         524     11.7%
no              194     4.3%
not-applicable  1001    22.4%
not-stated      1117    25.0%
stated something (yes|partial|no): 2354 = 52.6%; notified (yes|partial): 2160 = 48.3%

-- the same field, per population --
Population (all ∧ has an ethics record)  N     yes    partial  no     not-applicable  not-stated
---------------------------------------  ----  -----  -------  -----  --------------  ----------
empirical                                4472  36.6%  11.7%    4.3%   22.4%           25.0%
empirical ∧ measured the web platform    1362  33.2%  11.7%    7.0%   19.5%           28.6%
ran an automated web crawl               992   29.8%  13.7%    9.4%   15.9%           31.1%
ran a network scan or probe              858   37.6%  23.4%    4.2%   10.7%           24.0%
assessed compliance with a law           376   42.0%  14.6%    9.8%   21.5%           12.0%
crawled ∧ assessed a law                 123   35.0%  14.6%    14.6%  15.4%           20.3%
recruited human participants             1283  39.7%  7.6%     1.9%   35.3%           15.4%

==========================================================================
B. IS NOTIFICATION BECOMING A NORM? (four-year buckets)
==========================================================================
Indicator                              Denominator         2010–2013  2014–2017  2018–2021  2022–2024  2025–2026*
-------------------------------------  ------------------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ---------  ----------
Papers with an ethics record           empirical           338/460    610/718    1089/1272  1482/1649  953/1019
Notified (yes|partial)                 empirical ∧ ethics  21.3%      37.7%      45.9%      52.8%      60.3%
Said nothing (not-stated)              empirical ∧ ethics  61.5%      40.2%      26.5%      16.9%      13.1%
Notified (yes|partial), crawlers only  crawled ∧ ethics    14.6%      34.7%      41.4%      50.6%      54.3%
Gave any disclosureDetail text         empirical ∧ ethics  31.7%      48.4%      58.9%      70.8%      81.6%
Named a harm-mitigation step           empirical ∧ ethics  46.4%      61.1%      65.0%      76.8%      85.0%
Contacted a regulator or CERT (yes)    empirical ∧ ethics  0.3%       3.0%       4.7%       3.4%       2.8%

==========================================================================
C. REGULATOR / CERT CONTACT, AND HARM MITIGATION
==========================================================================

-- ethics.regulatorContact, of 4472 --
Value       Papers  Share
----------  ------  -----
yes         147     3.3%
no          1982    44.3%
not-stated  2343    52.4%

of the 376 that assessed a law: yes 27 (7.2%)

of the 2160 that notified an affected party, 135 also contacted a regulator or CERT (6.3%)
of the 147 that contacted a regulator or CERT, 135 ALSO notified the affected party directly (91.8%) — the intermediary is an addition, not a substitute

-- ethics.harmMitigation: 3186 of 4472 (71.2%) name at least one step --
Family (a paper can be in several)                                              Papers  Share of 3186
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  ------  -------------
anonymisation, aggregation, no PII collected                                    732     23.0%
NOTIFICATION — told the affected party                                          594     18.6%
rate limiting, bandwidth caps, low request volume                               287     9.0%
consent, permission, or cooperation obtained                                    259     8.1%
withheld, redacted, or delayed publication                                      241     7.6%
isolated testbed, own accounts, own devices                                     178     5.6%
no exploitation, non-invasive probing, restricted scope                         163     5.1%
access-controlled or encrypted storage                                          156     4.9%
NOTIFICATION — opt-out, exclusion list, or an explanatory page for the scanner  114     3.6%
debriefing, compensation, or support for participants                           65      2.0%
ethics board or legal review                                                    25      0.8%
unmapped residue: 1069 of 3186 (33.6%)
  (run with --residue to print all of it)

==========================================================================
D. WHAT ethics.disclosureDetail SAYS — CHANNELS AND OUTCOMES
==========================================================================
2870 of 4472 (64.2%) give free-text disclosure detail. The field is capped at 20 words, so it names a channel only when the channel was
the notable thing. These are rankings of an under-reported field, not adoption rates.

-- channel named in disclosureDetail, of 2870 papers that gave any disclosure detail --
Channel family                                                                 Papers  Share of 2870
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------  ------  -------------
a named large platform or app store (Google, Apple, Meta, Microsoft, Amazon…)  335     11.7%
direct email to the operator or developer                                      113     3.9%
CERT / CSIRT / national coordinator                                            39      1.4%
hosting provider / ISP / upstream                                              38      1.3%
bug bounty / vulnerability reward programme                                    36      1.3%
WHOIS / registry contact                                                       18      0.6%
data protection authority / regulator                                          17      0.6%
standards body / working group                                                 13      0.5%
generic contact form or phone                                                  10      0.3%
no channel named at all: 2303 of 2870 (80.2%)

-- channel named in disclosureDetail, of 2160 papers that notified (yes|partial) AND gave a detail — the population where "which channel?" is a fair question --
Channel family                                                                 Papers  Share of 2160
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------  ------  -------------
a named large platform or app store (Google, Apple, Meta, Microsoft, Amazon…)  318     14.7%
direct email to the operator or developer                                      99      4.6%
CERT / CSIRT / national coordinator                                            39      1.8%
bug bounty / vulnerability reward programme                                    35      1.6%
hosting provider / ISP / upstream                                              35      1.6%
WHOIS / registry contact                                                       15      0.7%
data protection authority / regulator                                          14      0.6%
standards body / working group                                                 13      0.6%
generic contact form or phone                                                  9       0.4%
no channel named at all: 1633 of 2160 (75.6%)

-- outcome named in disclosureDetail, of 2870 --
Outcome family                    Papers  Share of 2870
--------------------------------  ------  -------------
fixed / patched / removed         373     13.0%
acknowledged / confirmed          359     12.5%
CVE assigned or bounty paid       96      3.3%
no response / ignored / declined  25      0.9%
still pending / awaiting          18      0.6%
no outcome named: 2155 of 2870 (75.1%)

-- disclosureDetail entries carrying a number: 7 of 2870 (0.2%) --
  IMC/2016/ad-blockers-global-prevalence-and-impact
    Panel was 100% opt-in with thorough privacy disclosure pages.
  USENIX/2021/lzr-identifying-unexpected-internet-services
    No complaints or operator questions from the 1% scans; seven organizations complained during 100% scans.
  CCS/2022/an-extensive-study-of-residential-proxies-in-china
    Contacted 318 of 559 sensitive organizations; received 11 responses by submission.
  CCS/2022/understanding-iot-security-from-a-market-scale-perspective
    Reported confirmed case-study vulnerabilities to 12 of 18 vendors; reporting to six remained in progress.
  CCS/2022/do-opt-outs-really-opt-me-out
    Informed 10 of 11 inconsistent trackers by email; one corrected its opt-out implementation.
  USENIX/2024/fv8-a-forced-execution-javascript-engine-for-detecting-evasive-techniques
    Reported 110 malicious extensions to Google; 62.7% were removed.
  IMC/2025/poster-how-do-you-know-my-name-investigating-the-role-of-domain-names-for-target
    Cooperated with toplist maintainers and limited honey domains to 0.02% of top-10ⁿ domains.

==========================================================================
E. NOTIFICATION CAMPAIGNS IN THE FULL TEXT (hand-classified)
==========================================================================
Stage                                                                                     Papers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  ------
paper.cols.txt files read                                                                 5869
NARROW rule: notify ∧ outcome ∧ number in one sentence                                    179
  → hand-classified as a campaign                                                         28
  → hand-classified and rejected, with a reason                                           151
  → UNREVIEWED residue — matched, nobody read the paper                                   0
WIDE probe only: wider outcome/number vocabulary ∧ we/our, not caught by the narrow rule  78
  → hand-classified as a campaign                                                         3
  → hand-classified and rejected, with a reason                                           75
  → UNREVIEWED residue                                                                    0
campaigns in total (CAMPAIGNS)                                                            32

sanity: campaigns caught by neither rule (found by a topical full-text grep, see notify_fold.mjs caught:'grep'): 1 — the-security-lottery-measuring-client-side-web-security-inconsistencies
        campaigns caught only by the wide probe: 3 — playing-without-paying-detecting-vulnerable-payment-verification-in-native-binar, lazy-gatekeepers-a-large-scale-study-on-spf-configuration-in-the-wild, demystifying-rpki-invalid-prefixes-hidden-causes-and-security-risks
        REJECTED slugs caught by neither rule: 3 — how-website-owners-face-privacy-issues-thematic-analysis-of-responses-from-a-cov, from-whois-to-whowas-a-large-scale-measurement-study-of-domain-registration-privacy-under-the-gdpr, the-cve-wayback-machine-measuring-coordinated-disclosure-from-exploits-against-t
        REJECTED_PROBE slugs caught by neither rule: 0

-- campaigns by four-year bucket, of 32 hand-classified --
Bucket      Campaigns
----------  ---------
2010–2013   1
2014–2017   6
2018–2021   5
2022–2024   14
2025–2026*  6
Who was notified (network operators / web site operators / app or skill developers)  Campaigns
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------  ---------
network                                                                              13
web                                                                                  13
apps                                                                                 6

Two of the seven ethics.disclosureDetail ratios above are quoted on the content page and were re-verified against the JSONL by exact substring match: an-extensive-study-of-residential-proxies-in-china (CCS 2022) and fv8-a-forced-execution-javascript-engine-for-detecting-evasive-techniques (USENIX Sec 2024), one match each.

Free-text fields agree run-to-run on roughly 20% of exact strings, so nothing here is aggregated by exact string. Three folds were written, in scripts/report_notifying_websites.mjs and scripts/notify_fold.mjs.

Nine regex families, not mutually exclusive (a paper that told a CERT and the vendor belongs in both; papers counted once per family). Published on the content page as a ranking, never as adoption rates.

• Scoped to the right population, after a post-review check. The first version reported the channel fold over all 2,870 papers with a disclosureDetail, giving 80.2% with no channel named. Reading a sample of that residue showed the problem: disclosureDetail serves two purposes in the schema, notifying an operator and debriefing a participant, so the residue included entries like “Participants provided written or verbal consent; screen recordings were deleted after data collection” — papers that were never notifying an operator, for which “which channel?” is not a question. The script now prints both populations, and the page quotes the scoped one: 1,633 of the 2,160 papers that said they notified (75.6%) name no channel. All 2,160 yes/partial papers turn out to carry a detail, so that subset needs no separate silence figure.
• The residue is still the headline: three quarters of the papers that say they notified do not say through what. That is not a fold failure, it is the field's content — a 20-word summary of “we disclosed responsibly” names no channel.
• Two claims on the content page about this fold were checked directly against the JSONL rather than taken from the script. (a) “all 2,160 that said they notified are among them”: of the 2,160 yes/partial papers, 0 lack a disclosureDetail. (b) The scoping footnote's 38.5%: of the 710 papers that gave a detail without saying they notified, 273 match a participant/consent/debrief/interview/survey/recruit/volunteer term. That second figure exists because a reviewer challenged an earlier, stronger claim that the excluded group was participant-debriefing notes — it is not, and the page now says only that the channel question is ill-posed for that group.
• The largest matched family, “a named large platform or app store”, is a deliberately loose rule matching the strings google play, app store, play store, apple, google, amazon, facebook, meta, microsoft, marketplace, mozilla, chrome, android. It over-matches: a paper that used Google Play as a population source and disclosed elsewhere lands here. The label on the content page says “a named large platform”, not “notified a platform”, for that reason. Do not read 11.7% as “11.7% notified a platform”.
• hosting provider / ISP / upstream also matches the bare token registrar, which overlaps the WHOIS family. Both are under 1.5% and reported as a ranking, so the overlap is stated rather than resolved.

Five families, non-exclusive. Residue 2,155 of 2,870 (75.1%), published above. Not used on the content page except as the 75.1% figure.

Eleven families, non-exclusive. Residue 1,069 of 3,186 (33.6%). This fold is diagnostic only — no folded harm-mitigation figure appears on the content page; the page uses only the non-null count (71.2%) and its per-bucket trend, neither of which depends on the fold. The residue is therefore recorded here by shape rather than in full, and prints with node scripts/report_notifying_websites.mjs –residue.

Shape of the 1,069, read from the first ~60 entries and a shuffled sample of 45: almost entirely study-specific harm limitation with no generalisable family — “Used a wired testbed and 900-MHz transmitter to minimize GPS interference”, “Purchased unlimited daily plans so test traffic was not counted”, “Suppressed uploads from BitTorrent clients to avoid distributing illegal software”, “Captured only four bytes of application payload to minimise privacy impact”. A first attempt with mutually-exclusive first-match-wins rules and narrower regexes gave 46.5% residue and a nonsensical zero in one family; broadening the regexes and making families non-exclusive took it to 33.6%. It was not driven lower, because the remainder is genuinely one-off. Anyone wanting a publishable harm-mitigation taxonomy should treat that residue as the work, not as noise.

The one fold that is a hand list rather than a regex family list, and the reason is in the file: the corpus signal for “the authors ran a campaign” is a sentence, not a name. ethics.notifiedAffectedParties == yes does not distinguish a bulk campaign to thousands of strangers from one email to Google's security team, and those are different methods with different rates.

Candidate rule: over normaliseText(paper.cols.txt) (de-hyphenate line breaks, collapse whitespace), a sentence under 400 characters matching all three of

• NOTIFY_RE = /notif|disclos|reported (?:it |them |the )?to|informed|contacted|reach(?:ed)? out/i
• OUTCOME_RE = /respon|repl(?:y|ied|ies)|acknowledg|fix|patch|remediat|resolv|ignor|no answer|bounce|took? (?:it )?down|removed/i
• NUM_RE = a percentage, a comma-grouped integer, or an N of M ratio

Result over 5,869 files on 2026-08-13: 179 candidates → 22 campaigns, 16 rejected with a reason, 144 unreviewed. On 2026-09-04 the 144 were read: 6 promoted, 138 rejected with a reason (see the listing below). A wider recall probe was added the same day after a full-text search for security.txt turned up two campaigns the narrow rule had missed — IMC 2023 lazy-gatekeepers (“we have contacted 111 951 operators”: thin-space thousands, and “success rate” is not an outcome word) and USENIX Sec 2022 the-security-lottery. The probe (isWideCandidate: same notification verbs; outcome vocabulary + success|deliver|opened|unopened|acted|took action|clean-up|mitigat|feedback; numbers may be space-grouped; a first-person we/our is required so that “hosts contacted by malware” does not flood it) catches 78 further papers: 3 promoted, 75 rejected. the-security-lottery is caught by neither rule and is in CAMPAIGNS with caught: 'grep'. The script prints the two rules as separate stages and asserts that every slug either catches is classified; both UNREVIEWED counts are 0.

Inclusion threshold, applied by hand: the authors notified parties they did not already know, at a scale where the contact had to be looked up, and reported a delivery, response or remediation outcome. Rough scale floor ≥100 parties, which is why PETS 2022's 40-organisation SAR re-test is in the rejected list and quoted only in prose.

An earlier, wider first-pass scan (a looser regex, 197 candidates) was used to seed the 2026-08-13 hand list; the script reports that 3 rejections fall outside both committed rules — how-website-owners-face-privacy-issues…, from-whois-to-whowas… and the-cve-wayback-machine… — kept in REJECTED because they are papers a future run will want the reason for. The recall lesson of 2026-09-04: the narrow rule had a precision of 28/179 and caught 28 of the 32 campaigns now known; true recall is unmeasured, because the 32 are the union of what the rules and two ad-hoc greps found, not an independent gold set, so the miss count is a lower bound. The two committed rules together still miss one of the 32. A third rule — say, any sentence with a notification verb and a five-digit or larger count — would find more. That is the residual uncertainty behind “32 campaigns”.

Rejections, with the deciding reason (this is the part that stops the next run re-adding them):

The six campaigns not on the content page's rates table, because they report a volume sent but no response or remediation figure: freely-given-consent… (CCS 2022, 1,127 developers), dancer-in-the-dark… (USENIX Sec 2024, 19% response — this one is quoted in prose), beyond-exploit-scanning… (USENIX Sec 2025, 4,983 emails), hey-your-secrets-leaked… (IEEE S&P 2025, 3,906 emails), beyond-the-horizon… (IEEE S&P 2025, 15,837 ASes), and — added 2026-09-04 — [1Zuo, Chaoshun; Lin, Zhiqiang (2022): "Playing Without Paying: Detecting Vulnerable Payment Verification in Native Binaries of Unity Mobile Games", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)] (USENIX Sec 2022, 5,494 game developers emailed via their Play Store address; “Many of the developers have acknowledged our findings”, no count).

So the rates table has 27 rows: 26 of the 32 hand-classified campaigns, plus [2Stock, Ben; Pellegrino, Giancarlo; Li, Frank; Backes, Michael; Rossow, Christian (2018): "Didn't You Hear Me? - Towards More Successful Web Vulnerability Notifications", in: Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium. (DOI)], which is not in CAMPAIGNS because its full text is not in the corpus (see below) and the fold only classifies papers the scan could read. catch-22… and seeking-nonsense… are on the table for their channel, not for a rate. 26 + 6 = 32. (extended-hell-o…, USENIX Sec 2023, was listed among the not-shown on 2026-08-13 although CAMPAIGNS records its 39.7% remediation figure; the 2026-09-04 figures reviewer caught the carry-over and it is now row [3Blechschmidt, Birk; Stock, Ben (2023): "Extended Hell(o): A Comprehensive Large-Scale Study on Email Confidentiality and Integrity Mechanisms in the Wild", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)] on the table.)

How they were read. scripts/notify_residue_context.mjs dumped, for each candidate, every sentence in paper.cols.txt that carries a notification-act verb (notify/disclose/report to/contact/reach out/inform, minus the noise senses: information disclosure, self-disclosure, push notification, disclosure date), with its line number — 5,584 lines for the 144 papers, tightened to 1,701 by requiring a number or an outcome word in the same sentence. Those were read in full by the orchestrator. The 78 probe candidates were screened differently and more thinly: on the one to three probe-matching sentences the probe itself printed (out/notify_recall_probe-output.txt), not on every notification-verb sentence. Anything that looked like a campaign, or was cited on the page for some other reason, was then read in full: nine papers by four Sonnet sub-agents (notes/notify_read_batch1.md–batch4.md), eight more by the orchestrator from the relevant passages. The tag on each rejection records which: [sentences] or [read]. 201 of the 229 rejections are sentence-level screens (126 on all notification-verb sentences, 75 on the probe sentences only); 28 rest on a full read — a paper that describes its campaign without a notification verb in the same sentence as a number would have slipped past.

Inclusion rule, unchanged from 2026-08-13: the authors notified parties they did not already know, at a scale where the contact had to be looked up (roughly ≥100 parties), and reported a delivery, response or remediation outcome. Two judgement calls at the edge, both recorded in the fold file: seeking-nonsense… (IEEE S&P 2016) is in because a national CERT notified the organisations on the authors' behalf and 27 fixes are reported, even though the denominator is not — the same pattern as catch-22…; demystifying-rpki-invalid-prefixes… (NDSS 2026) is in although its mail asked for confirmation rather than a fix, because it is the only 2025–2026 delivery figure for RIR WHOIS contacts in the corpus and the page says what it is.

Rejections that a looser rule would have counted: weak-keys… (61 vendors, tabulated responses — manufacturers, not operators); mind-your-manrs… (six operators); inconsistent-incomplete… (58 disclosure briefings to a defined set of services); behind-closed-doors… (43 administrators); an-evaluation-of-the-google-chrome-extension… (32 developers, 19 fixed); the-unusual-suspects… (482 webshop owners cold-called — to recruit interviewees, not to notify). All quoted or noted on the page where they carry a point; none in the table.

# Classification of the 138 candidates unreviewed on 2026-08-13 (narrow rule), 2026-09-04
# PROMOTED (6)
seeking-nonsense-looking-for-trouble-efficient-promotional-infection-detection-t :: IEEE-SP 2016 — "27 responded and fixed their problems" among the organisations CCERT notified; the denominator is not stated, so no rate is computable
are-we-there-yet-on-rpki-s-deployment-and-security :: NDSS 2017 — only 168 of 552 emails did not bounce (69.6% bounced); "Over 42%" of bad-ROA alerts fixed within a month against "about 15%" for operators R
complex-security-policy-a-longitudinal-analysis-of-deployed-content-security-policies :: NDSS 2020 — "most emails bounced"; 117 non-automated responses; sites deploying frame-ancestors rose from 511 to 554 (+43) by 12 June 2019; 62 responder
measuring-alexa-skill-privacy-practices-across-three-years :: WWW 2022 — of the 246: 111 (45.12%) "no longer pose a threat" about a year later (45 removed, 24 permission removed, 41 fixed — the parts sum to 110); 
are-you-spying-on-me-large-scale-analysis-on-iot-data-exposure-through-companion :: USENIX 2023 — after one month: opened by 381, unopened for 850, bounced from 150 invalid addresses; 21 of the 381 openers acknowledged and changed their p
are-we-getting-well-informed-an-in-depth-study-of-runtime-privacy-notice-practic :: CCS 2024 — 4,169 delivered; 821 unique replies, 60 of them not automatic, 13 confirming the report with substantive feedback; no re-scan, so no remedia

# REJECTED (138), tag = screening level
internet-background-radiation-revisited :: [sentences] IMC 2010 — contacted the software vendors responsible for a misconfiguration; a few vendors, no counts.
selecting-representative-ip-addresses-for-internet-topology-studies :: [sentences] IMC 2010 — 'responsive' and 'informed' are probing vocabulary (hitlist responsiveness); nothing was notified.
before-we-knew-it-an-empirical-study-of-zero-day-attacks-in-the-real-world :: [sentences] CCS 2012 — 'disclosure' is the public disclosure date of a vulnerability; no notification sent.
when-firmware-modifications-attack-a-case-study-of-embedded-exploitation :: [sentences] NDSS 2013 — one vendor (HP) disclosure; the 1.08% is end-user patching of 90,000 printers after the vendor fix, not a campaign outcome.
an-empirical-study-of-vulnerability-rewards-programs :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2013 — Chrome/Firefox reward programmes analysed from public data.
two-years-of-short-urls-internet-measurement-security-threats-and-countermeasure :: [sentences] WWW 2013 — users contacted the authors about a browser add-on; no notification.
a-look-at-targeted-attacks-through-the-lense-of-an-ngo :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2014 — CVE public disclosure dates.
brahmastra-driving-apps-to-test-the-security-of-third-party-components :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2014 — list of vulnerable apps shared with the Facebook security team, which contacted developers itself; one platform.
the-attack-of-the-clones-a-study-of-the-impact-of-shared-code-on-vulnerability-p :: [sentences] IEEE S&P 2015 — patch deployment against public disclosure dates; no notification.
checking-more-and-alerting-less-detecting-privacy-leakages-via-enhanced-data-flo :: [sentences] NDSS 2015 — 'privacy disclosures' are app data flows.
portrait-of-a-privacy-invasion :: [sentences] PETS 2015 — users disclosing relationship status.
talos-neutralizing-vulnerabilities-with-security-workarounds-for-rapid-response :: [sentences] IEEE S&P 2016 — patch timing after public disclosure from CVE data.
weak-keys-remain-widespread-in-network-devices :: [read] IMC 2016 — vendor disclosure: 61 vendors in 2012 (37 with RSA issues: 5 public advisory, 11 private response, 3 auto-response, 18 no response — Table 2 is a flattened four-column layout; the 12/9 reading of 2026-09-04 was corrected to 3/18 by a reviewer working from the PDF's column positions, and the caption's 'about half acknowledged receipt' (19 of 37) confirms it) and 5 more in May 2016 (2 acknowledged, 1 advisory). Manufacturers rather than operators, and under the 100-party floor; quoted on the page for 'little correlation with end-user security'.
towards-mining-latent-client-identifiers-from-network-traffic :: [sentences] PETS 2016 — Apple Push Notification traffic.
if-you-are-not-paying-for-it-you-are-the-product-how-much-do-advertisers-pay-to :: [sentences] IMC 2017 — RTB winning-price notifications.
wiretapping-end-to-end-encrypted-voip-calls-real-world-attacks-on-zrtp :: [sentences] PETS 2017 — one vendor, one CVE.
from-patching-delays-to-infection-symptoms-using-risk-profiles-for-an-early-disc :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2018 — public disclosure and patch data.
wpse-fortifying-web-protocols-via-browser-side-security-monitoring :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2018 — disclosed to the owners of 55 websites and to library vendors; no counts, under the floor.
a-usability-evaluation-of-lets-encrypt-and-certbot-usable-security-done-right :: [sentences] CCS 2019 — the matched sentence is related work about Heartbleed; the paper is a lab study.
automating-patching-of-vulnerable-open-source-software-versions-in-application-binaries :: [sentences] NDSS 2019 — describes Google's App Security Improvement Program; no notification by the authors.
digital-healthcare-associated-infection-a-case-study-on-the-security-of-a-major-multi-campus-hospital-system :: [sentences] NDSS 2019 — one hospital system's administrators.
we-value-your-privacy-now-take-some-cookies-measuring-the-gdprs-impact-on-web-privacy :: [sentences] NDSS 2019 — 'cookie consent notifications'.
accessileaks-investigating-privacy-leaks-exposed-by-the-android-accessibility-se :: [sentences] PETS 2019 — a user-facing warning notification and pull requests to app developers; no campaign.
50-ways-to-leak-your-data-an-exploration-of-apps-circumvention-of-the-android-pe :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2019 — disclosed to Google and the FTC.
evaluating-the-contextual-integrity-of-privacy-regulation-parents-iot-toy-privac :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2019 — COPPA notification-and-consent principles in a survey.
the-betrayal-at-cloud-city-an-empirical-analysis-of-cloud-based-mobile-backends :: [read] USENIX Sec 2019 — tiered notification (Play Store contact, then WHOIS, then Google's tracker) to developers of vulnerable backends, but 'awaiting remediation' with no counts of parties, deliveries or replies.
studying-preferences-and-concerns-about-information-disclosure-in-email-notifica :: [sentences] WWW 2019 — privacy of email notifications shown on screens; a user study.
dangerous-skills-got-certified-measuring-the-trustworthiness-of-skill-certificat :: [sentences] CCS 2020 — responsible disclosure to Amazon and Google; platforms.
a-security-analysis-of-the-facebook-ad-library :: [sentences] IEEE S&P 2020 — 'undisclosed' political ads.
the-many-kinds-of-creepware-used-for-interpersonal-attacks :: [read] IEEE S&P 2020 — 1,095 apps reported to Google, 813 removed. A bulk report to one platform rather than to operators; quoted on the page as a platform take-down figure.
behind-closed-doors-a-network-tale-of-spoofing-intrusion-and-false-dns-security :: [read] IMC 2020 — 43 resolver administrators reached through the SOA RNAME field, 5 replies (3 from people the authors knew), plus two operators of loopback resolvers; under the floor. The wider outreach is described as planned. Quoted for the SOA-RNAME channel.
broken-metre-attacking-resource-metering-in-evm :: [sentences] NDSS 2020 — Ethereum Foundation bounty.
the-price-is-not-right-comparing-privacy-in-free-and-paid-apps :: [sentences] PETS 2020 — privacy-policy disclosure.
actions-speak-louder-than-words-entity-sensitive-privacy-policy-and-data-flow-an :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2020 — policy 'disclosures'.
cached-and-confused-web-cache-deception-in-the-wild :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2020 — notification letters to the publicly listed security contacts of 16 sites (93 domains); no delivery or response figures; under the floor.
plug-n-pwned-comprehensive-vulnerability-analysis-of-obd-ii-dongles-as-a-new-ove :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2020 — 29 dongle vendors emailed; vendors, under the floor.
an-empirical-study-of-the-use-of-integrity-verification-mechanisms-for-web-subre :: [sentences] WWW 2020 — survey respondents.
i-need-a-better-description-an-investigation-into-user-expectations-for-differen :: [sentences] CCS 2021 — 'information disclosure' in a differential-privacy user study.
sok-quantifying-cyber-risk :: [sentences] IEEE S&P 2021 — an SoK citing the notification studies already on the page.
all-the-numbers-are-us-large-scale-abuse-of-contact-discovery-in-mobile-messengers :: [sentences] NDSS 2021 — WhatsApp, Signal and Telegram.
shadow-attacks-hiding-and-replacing-content-in-signed-pdfs :: [sentences] NDSS 2021 — 15 PDF vendors via CERT-Bund.
defining-privacy-how-users-interpret-technical-terms-in-privacy-policies :: [sentences] PETS 2021 — survey.
digital-inequality-through-the-lens-of-self-disclosure :: [sentences] PETS 2021 — self-disclosure on social media.
a-large-scale-interview-study-on-information-security-in-and-attacks-against-sma :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2021 — CATI recruitment response rate (43,219 companies called).
injection-attacks-reloaded-tunnelling-malicious-payloads-over-dns :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2021 — 'disclose contents of /some/file'.
now-im-a-bit-angry-individuals-awareness-perception-and-responses-to-data-breach :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2021 — breach notifications to consumers; a user study.
clues-in-tweets-twitter-guided-discovery-and-analysis-of-sms-spam :: [sentences] CCS 2022 — 'several attempts' to disclose to the developers of a few text-messaging apps.
timing-based-browsing-privacy-vulnerabilities-via-site-isolation :: [sentences] IEEE S&P 2022 — Chrome and Edge teams.
characterizing-permanently-dead-links-on-wikipedia :: [sentences] IMC 2022 — the Internet Archive informed the authors.
mind-your-manrs-measuring-the-manrs-ecosystem :: [read] IMC 2022 — six large network operators told about non-conformant announcements; five replied, two fixes verified. Direct disclosure to already-identified parties, under the floor.
auto-draft-219 :: [sentences] NDSS 2022 (SpiralSpy) — 'system notification' of a fan-status change.
developers-say-the-darnedest-things-privacy-compliance-processes-followed-by-dev :: [sentences] PETS 2022 — developers report receiving app-store notifications; a survey.
exploring-the-privacy-concerns-of-bystanders-in-smart-homes-from-the-perspective :: [sentences] PETS 2022 — notifying bystanders about data practices; a user study.
we-may-share-the-number-of-diaper-changes-a-privacy-and-security-analysis-of-mob :: [sentences] PETS 2022 — vendors of child-care apps.
movery-a-precise-approach-for-modified-vulnerable-code-clone-discovery-from-modi :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2022 — 'disclosed vulnerable functions' from CVE data.
understanding-the-practice-of-security-patch-management-across-multiple-branches :: [sentences] WWW 2022 — CVE disclosure dates.
dont-leak-your-keys-understanding-measuring-and-exploiting-the-appsecret-leaks-i :: [sentences] CCS 2023 — Tencent and Baidu bounties.
passive-ssh-key-compromise-via-lattices :: [sentences] CCS 2023 — four manufacturers and CERT/CC; the authors 'considered notifying operators of affected devices ... but we determined this would be infeasible'. Quoted on the page as a reasoned decision not to run a campaign.
no-one-drinks-from-the-firehose-how-organizations-filter-and-prioritize-vulnerab :: [sentences] IEEE S&P 2023 — interviews on how organisations consume vulnerability notifications; receiving end, no campaign.
no-privacy-in-the-electronics-repair-industry :: [sentences] IEEE S&P 2023 — survey respondents.
three-birds-with-one-stone-efficient-partitioning-attacks-on-interdependent-cryp :: [sentences] IEEE S&P 2023 — nodes that 'publicly disclose' overlay addresses.
utopia-automatic-generation-of-fuzz-driver-using-unit-tests :: [sentences] IEEE S&P 2023 — 123 bug reports to open-source projects, 70 confirmed; bug reporting to maintainers, not operator notification.
a-longitudinal-study-of-vulnerable-client-side-resources-and-web-developers-upda :: [sentences] IMC 2023 — disclosure to Google's CDN.
rovista-measuring-and-analyzing-the-route-origin-validation-rov-in-rpki :: [sentences] IMC 2023 — reached out to network operators, one response (BIT), plus AT&T and APNIC; under the floor.
wolf-in-sheeps-clothing-evaluating-security-risks-of-the-undelegated-record-on-d :: [sentences] IMC 2023 — DNS hosting providers named in the paper.
investigating-how-users-imagine-their-personal-privacy-assistant :: [sentences] PETS 2023 — UI notifications.
lessons-in-vcr-repair-compliance-of-android-app-developers-with-the-california-c :: [sentences] PETS 2023 — CCPA verifiable consumer requests to app developers (69 substantive responses); a rights-request study, not a notification. See practices:legal_enforcement.
on-the-role-and-form-of-personal-information-disclosure-in-cyberbullying-inciden :: [sentences] PETS 2023 — self-disclosure.
privacy-rarely-considered-exploring-considerations-in-the-adoption-of-third-part :: [sentences] PETS 2023 — 37,000 survey invitations; recruitment, not notification.
revoked-just-now-users-behaviors-toward-fitness-data-sharing-with-third-party-ap :: [sentences] PETS 2023 — survey.
a-bugs-life-analyzing-the-lifecycle-and-mitigation-process-of-content-security-p :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2023 — CSP browser-bug lifecycle from bug trackers.
all-of-them-claim-to-be-the-best-multi-perspective-study-of-vpn-users-and-vpn-pr :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2023 — 15 VPN providers invited to interviews.
arana-discovering-and-characterizing-password-guessing-attacks-in-practice :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2023 — compromised usernames disclosed to two universities' security teams.
downgrading-dnssec-how-to-exploit-crypto-agility-for-hijacking-signed-zones :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2023 — five named DNS vendors and operators.
internet-service-providers-and-individuals-attitudes-barriers-and-incentives-to :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2023 — ISP survey on barriers to notifying IoT owners under Japan's NOTICE programme; receiving end, no campaign.
my-privacy-for-their-security-employees-privacy-perspectives-and-expectations-wh :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2023 — employee survey.
panda-security-analysis-of-algorand-smart-contracts :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2023 — one DeFi developer, a bounty.
pushed-by-accident-a-mixed-methods-study-on-strategies-of-handling-secret-inform :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2023 — GitHub secret-leak notifications recalled by survey participants.
whip-improving-static-vulnerability-detection-in-web-application-by-forcing-tool :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2023 — 35 zero-days disclosed to the developers of 14 applications.
airgapagent-protecting-privacy-conscious-conversational-agents :: [sentences] CCS 2024 — 'disclosure of extraneous user information' by an LLM agent.
defying-the-odds-solanas-unexpected-resilience-in-spite-of-the-security-challeng :: [sentences] CCS 2024 — participant recruitment.
breach-extraction-attacks-exposing-and-addressing-the-leakage-in-second-generati :: [sentences] IEEE S&P 2024 — Cloudflare.
from-virtual-touch-to-tesla-command-unlocking-unauthenticated-control-chains-fro :: [sentences] IEEE S&P 2024 — named stakeholders.
shedding-light-on-cvss-scoring-inconsistencies-a-user-centric-study-on-evaluatin :: [sentences] IEEE S&P 2024 — study participants re-contacted.
sok-sgx-fail-how-stuff-gets-exposed :: [sentences] IEEE S&P 2024 — SoK; disclosure timing from prior work.
tabbed-out-subverting-the-android-custom-tab-security-model :: [sentences] IEEE S&P 2024 — Google's Chrome VRP.
dont-interrupt-me-a-large-scale-study-of-on-device-permission-prompt-quieting-in-chrome :: [sentences] NDSS 2024 — browser notification-permission prompts.
understanding-the-implementation-and-security-implications-of-protective-dns-services :: [sentences] NDSS 2024 — DNS vendors.
exploring-the-privacy-experiences-of-closeted-users-of-online-dating-services-in :: [sentences] PETS 2024 — survey.
security-and-privacy-with-second-hand-storage-devices-a-user-centric-perspective :: [sentences] PETS 2024 — whether buyers would notify anyone about found data; a survey.
the-medium-is-the-message-how-secure-messaging-apps-leak-sensitive-data-to-push :: [sentences] PETS 2024 — 11 app developers, 6 had not replied; under the floor.
diffie-hellman-picture-show-key-exchange-stories-from-commercial-vowifi-deployme :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2024 — MediaTek, the GSMA CVD programme, Apple and Google.
digital-discrimination-of-users-in-sanctioned-states-the-case-of-the-cuba-embarg :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2024 — geoblocking 'disclosures' shown to users.
globalconfusion-trustzone-trusted-application-0-days-by-design :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2024 — TrustZone vendors, four CVEs.
malla-demystifying-real-world-large-language-model-integrated-malicious-services :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2024 — OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta, Poe and FlowGPT; platforms.
rethinking-the-security-threats-of-stale-dns-glue-records :: [read] USENIX Sec 2024 — TLD registries, resolver vendors and ICANN; the 6 million affected domains were handed to the national CERT ('await their response'), no outcome reported.
spf-beyond-the-standard-management-and-operational-challenges-in-practice-and-pr :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2024 — one vendor report and an operator survey.
towards-more-practical-threat-models-in-artificial-intelligence-security :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2024 — survey respondents.
unpacking-privacy-labels-a-measurement-and-developer-perspective-on-googles-data :: [read] USENIX Sec 2024 — the top 10,000 developers per label pattern were emailed questions about their Data Safety labels (3,500 responses, 889 usable): recruitment for a developer study, not notification of a defect.
unfiltered-measuring-cloud-based-email-filtering-bypasses :: [read] WWW 2024 — chose NOT to notify the affected domains, citing Bennett et al.'s finding that 'over 80% of the domains contacted were unresponsive', and worked with seven filtering vendors instead. Quoted on the page as a reasoned decision against a campaign; the 80% is not this paper's measurement.
a-decade-long-landscape-of-advanced-persistent-threats-longitudinal-analysis-and :: [sentences] CCS 2025 — CVE disclosure dates.
is-this-a-scam-the-nature-and-quality-of-reddit-discussion-about-scams :: [sentences] CCS 2025 — Reddit posts.
gptracker-a-large-scale-measurement-of-misused-gpts :: [read] IEEE S&P 2025 — two disclosures to OpenAI; 1,316 of 1,804 GPTs reported on 11 September 2024 removed by 25 September. A bulk report to one platform; quoted on the page as a platform take-down figure.
sniffing-location-privacy-of-video-conference-users-using-free-audio-channels :: [sentences] IEEE S&P 2025 — notification tones.
hitchhiking-vaccine-enhancing-botnet-remediation-with-remote-code-deployment-reuse :: [sentences] NDSS 2025 — remediation payloads that notify infected users; not a campaign by the authors.
was-this-you-investigating-the-design-considerations-for-suspicious-login-notifications :: [sentences] NDSS 2025 — login-notification design, interviews.
who-is-trying-to-access-my-account-exploring-user-perceptions-and-reactions-to-risk-based-authentication-notifications :: [sentences] NDSS 2025 — risk-based-authentication notifications, survey.
ai-is-from-the-devil-behaviors-and-concerns-toward-personal-data-sharing-with-ll :: [sentences] PETS 2025 — survey.
how-unique-is-whose-web-browser-the-role-of-demographics-in-browser-fingerprinti :: [sentences] PETS 2025 — informed consent of participants.
privacy-perceptions-and-behaviors-towards-targeted-advertising-on-social-media-a :: [sentences] PETS 2025 — survey.
the-effect-of-platform-policies-on-app-privacy-compliance-a-study-of-child-direc :: [sentences] PETS 2025 — Google Play's own notifications to developers.
a-mixed-methods-study-of-open-source-software-maintainers-on-vulnerability-manag :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2025 — recruitment.
an-industry-interview-study-of-software-signing-for-supply-chain-security :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2025 — recruitment (30 candidates).
collisionrepair-first-aid-and-automated-patching-for-storage-collision-vulnerabi :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2025 — a prior tool 'did not disclose runtime overhead'.
exploring-user-security-and-privacy-attitudes-and-concerns-toward-the-use-of-gen :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2025 — interviews.
gpuhammer-rowhammer-attacks-on-gpu-memories-are-practical :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2025 — NVIDIA.
malicious-llm-based-conversational-ai-makes-users-reveal-personal-information :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2025 — UI pop-up notifications.
misty-registry-an-empirical-study-of-flawed-domain-registry-operation :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2025 — registries and their backend providers, named.
privacy-law-enforcement-under-centralized-governance-a-qualitative-analysis-of-f :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2025 — government notifications to app providers, interviews.
regulating-smart-device-support-periods-user-expectations-and-the-european-cyber :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2025 — survey.
your-shield-is-my-sword-a-persistent-denial-of-service-attack-via-the-reuse-of-u :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2025 — DNS vendors.
consumer-beware-exploring-data-brokers-ccpa-compliance :: [sentences] IEEE S&P 2026 — CCPA requests to data brokers (41.2% answered emails where the form was broken); a rights-request study. See practices:legal_enforcement.
chameleoscan-demystifying-and-detecting-ios-chameleon-apps-via-llm-powered-ui-exploration :: [sentences] NDSS 2026 — Apple.
cross-boundary-mobile-tracking-exploring-java-to-javascript-information-diffusion-in-webviews :: [sentences] NDSS 2026 — 'zip code disclosures' are data flows.
demystifying-the-access-control-mechanism-of-esxi-vmkernel :: [sentences] NDSS 2026 — VMware bounty.
tickets-to-hide-an-inside-look-into-the-anti-abuse-ecosystem-through-internal-abuse-data :: [read] NDSS 2026 — the receiving end: 1.3 million abuse reports at one hosting provider, 2.6% linked to a client notification. Not a campaign; cited on the page for what happens to a report after it arrives.
time-and-time-again-leveraging-tcp-timestamps-to-improve-remote-timing-attacks :: [sentences] NDSS 2026 — 'reached out to the homepages' is an HTTP request.
unveiling-byovd-threats-malwares-use-and-abuse-of-kernel-drivers :: [sentences] NDSS 2026 — Microsoft and driver vendors.
more-space-less-privacy-measuring-the-effectiveness-of-ip-based-website-fingerpr :: [sentences] PETS 2026 — no notification.
personal-data-flows-and-privacy-policy-traceability-in-third-party-llm-apps-in-t :: [sentences] PETS 2026 — privacy-policy disclosure.
precision-leads-recalling-you-improved-location-privacy-for-shared-mobility-serv :: [sentences] PETS 2026 — dataset maintainers.
the-role-of-online-forums-in-developer-understanding-of-privacy-law-a-reddit-cas :: [sentences] PETS 2026 — GDPR breach notification as a discussion topic.
abuse-risks-are-often-inherent-to-product-features-exploring-ai-vendors-bug-boun :: [read] USENIX Sec 2026 — catalogues AI vendors' disclosure policies (96 vendors have no channel at all); nothing was notified. security.txt was one of its three discovery sources.
inconsistent-incomplete-and-insecure-a-survey-of-account-security-interfaces :: [read] USENIX Sec 2026 — 58 disclosure briefings to a defined set of top-100 services (38 acknowledged, 25 substantive, most 'Not applicable'/'Out of scope'), no fix rate; under the floor. Quoted on the page for its security.txt count (34 of 100) and HackerOne rate limiting.
the-art-of-hide-and-seek-making-pickle-based-model-supply-chain-poisoning-stealt :: [sentences] USENIX Sec 2026 — NVIDIA, Keras, Protect AI; bounty.
bowling-with-chatgpt-on-the-evolving-user-interactions-with-conversational-ai-sy :: [sentences] WWW 2026 — survey.
falconscope-effective-and-efficient-detection-of-hidden-web-interfaces-in-iot-de :: [sentences] WWW 2026 — coordinated disclosure to IoT vendors, 50 CVEs.
unveiling-the-resilience-of-llm-enhanced-search-engines-against-black-hat-seo-ma :: [sentences] WWW 2026 — 1,602 sites reported to Google; a platform report.

# WIDE PROBE: 78 candidates outside the narrow rule
# PROMOTED (3)
playing-without-paying-detecting-vulnerable-payment-verification-in-native-binar :: USENIX 2022 — "Many of the developers have acknowledged our findings"; no counts, so a volume-only row
lazy-gatekeepers-a-large-scale-study-on-spf-configuration-in-the-wild :: IMC 2023 — 6,931 of 211,018 errors fixed two weeks later — "a success rate of 3.3 %"; 300 thank-you mails, 3 spam complaints put on an opt-out list; bo
demystifying-rpki-invalid-prefixes-hidden-causes-and-security-risks :: NDSS 2026 — 302 of 1,385 undeliverable (21.8%); 174 organisations responded (16.1% of the 1,083 delivered), confirming 349 prefixes as misconfigurations
# FOUND OUTSIDE BOTH RULES (1)
the-security-lottery-measuring-client-side-web-security-inconsistencies :: USENIX 2022 — delivery-failed for 197 of 256 domains; 21 non-automatic answers, 7 confirmed and fixed or explained; second round May 2022: 184 still affec
# REJECTED (75), all screened on the probe-matching sentences only
botmagnifier-locating-spambots-on-the-internet :: bots contacted C&C servers
peerpress-utilizing-enemies-p2p-strength-against-them :: probing accuracy
an-evaluation-of-the-google-chrome-extension-security-architecture :: 32 extension developers contacted, 19 fixed — real but under the floor and to a known set
juice-a-longitudinal-study-of-an-seo-botnet :: IPs contacted a proxy
an-internet-wide-view-of-internet-wide-scanning :: how organisations contacted the scanning team to opt out; receiving end of scanning, see practices:ethics
on-the-practical-exploitability-of-dual-ec-in-tls-implementations :: servers contacted by a scan
security-by-any-other-name-on-the-effectiveness-of-provider-based-email-security :: MTAs contacted by a scan
ad-injection-at-scale-assessing-deceptive-advertisement-modifications :: domains contacted by extensions
copperdroid-automatic-reconstruction-of-android-malware-behaviors :: 'disclosed' malware behaviours
domain-z-28-registrations-later-measuring-the-exploitation-of-residual-trust-in :: domains contacted by malware
recommended-for-you-a-first-look-at-content-recommendation-networks :: websites contacting a CRN
internet-jones-and-the-raiders-of-the-lost-trackers-an-archaeological-study-of-w :: third parties contacted by sites
investigating-commercial-pay-per-install-and-the-distribution-of-unwanted-softwa :: domains contacted by binaries
privacy-in-epigenetics-temporal-linkability-of-microrna-expression-profiles :: 'disclosing' miRNAs
no-honor-among-thieves-a-large-scale-analysis-of-malicious-web-shells :: domains contacted by shells
a-lustrum-of-malware-network-communication-evolution-and-insights :: domains contacted by malware
vuddy-a-scalable-approach-for-vulnerable-code-clone-discovery :: one Red Hat security officer
internet-scale-probing-of-cps-inference-characterization-and-orchestration-analy :: darkspace contacted by a scanning campaign
a-longitudinal-end-to-end-view-of-the-dnssec-ecosystem :: four operators asked for a reason
how-tracking-companies-circumvented-ad-blockers-using-websockets :: receivers contacted by parties
o-peer-where-art-thou-uncovering-remote-peering-interconnections-at-ixps :: IXP operators asked to validate
understanding-tor-usage-with-privacy-preserving-measurement :: Amazon employees; guards contacted by clients
adversarial-perceptual-ad-blocking-meets-adversarial-machine-learning :: ad-disclosure logos
just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg-internet-scale-exploitation-of-routers-for-cryptojac :: asked Censys about its crawl
watching-you-watch-the-tracking-ecosystem-of-over-the-top-tv-streaming-devices :: tracker domains contacted
scanning-the-scanners-sensing-the-internet-from-a-massively-distributed-network :: IPs contacted by scanners
hack-for-hire-exploring-the-emerging-market-for-account-hijacking :: 27 hack-for-hire services contacted as customers
a-systematic-study-of-elastic-objects-in-kernel-exploitation :: 'disclose data from kernel heap'
a-haystack-full-of-needles-scalable-detection-of-iot-devices-in-the-wild :: service IPs contacted by devices
when-push-comes-to-ads-measuring-the-rise-of-malicious-push-advertising :: notification permission requests
angel-or-devil-a-privacy-study-of-mobile-parental-control-apps :: service contacted by apps
nomoats-towards-automatic-detection-of-mobile-tracking :: hostnames contacted
ethbmc-a-bounded-model-checker-for-smart-contracts :: authors of a prior tool contacted for data
dark-matter-uncovering-the-darkcomet-rat-ecosystem :: IRB approval to report 57,805 victims to their ISPs — 'engaging ISPs'; no outcome reported
the-chameleon-attack-manipulating-content-display-in-online-social-media :: Facebook groups contacted as a test
crawlphish-large-scale-analysis-of-client-side-cloaking-techniques-in-phishing :: users allowing notifications
follow-the-scent-defeating-ipv6-prefix-rotation-privacy :: one CPE manufacturer
privacyflash-pro-automating-privacy-policy-generation-for-mobile-apps :: a few policy-generator operators
reining-in-the-webs-inconsistencies-with-site-policy :: disclosure to a few named sites, qualitative feedback
privacy-preference-signals-past-present-and-future :: second-level domains contacted per site
shhh-be-quiet-reducing-the-unwanted-interruptions-of-notification-permission-pro :: notification permission prompts
websocket-adoption-and-the-landscape-of-the-real-time-web :: WebSocket push notifications
measuring-and-mitigating-the-risk-of-ip-reuse-on-public-clouds :: IPs contacted by traffic
deep-dive-into-the-iot-backend-ecosystem :: backend servers contacted
malnet-a-binary-centric-network-level-profiling-of-iot-malware :: C2 servers contacted
where-to-recruit-for-security-development-studies-comparing-six-software-develop :: 76,978 developers contacted for study recruitment
when-free-tier-becomes-free-to-enter-a-non-intrusive-way-to-identify-security-ca :: camera motion notifications
detection-of-inconsistencies-in-privacy-practices-of-browser-extensions :: dashboard disclosures
hope-of-delivery-extracting-user-locations-from-mobile-instant-messengers :: delivery-notification timing
usability-and-enforceability-of-global-privacy-control :: BuiltWith operators contacted with a suggestion
dscope-a-cloud-native-internet-telescope :: scanners contacting telescopes
locin-inferring-semantic-location-from-spatial-maps-in-mixed-reality :: IRB contacted
the-ok-is-not-enough-a-large-scale-study-of-consent-dialogs-in-smartphone-applic :: tracking endpoints contacted by apps
timeless-timing-attacks-and-preload-defenses-in-tors-dns-cache :: the Tor Project
user-awareness-and-behaviors-concerning-encrypted-dns-settings-in-web-browsers :: survey
on-how-zero-knowledge-proof-blockchain-mixers-improve-and-worsen-user-privacy :: authors of a prior paper contacted for data
characterizing-and-mitigating-phishing-attacks-at-cctld-scale :: registry-side suspension time after a Netcraft notification; not the authors' campaign
content-nudges-and-incentives-a-study-on-the-effectiveness-and-perception-of-emb :: recruitment
targeted-and-troublesome-tracking-and-advertising-on-childrens-websites :: ad disclosures
diffaudit-auditing-privacy-practices-of-online-services-for-children-and-adolesc :: domains contacted
the-roots-go-deep-measuring-under-change :: anycast site contacted
content-censorship-in-the-interplanetary-file-system :: peers contacted
like-comment-get-scammed-characterizing-comment-scams-on-media-platforms :: scammers contacted as bait
masterkey-automated-jailbreaking-of-large-language-model-chatbots :: jailbreak disclosure to vendors
why-privacy-preserving-protocols-are-sometimes-not-enough-a-case-study-of-the-br :: 'disclosure attack'
can-virtual-reality-protect-users-from-keystroke-inference-attacks :: 'disclosure of confidential' data
ghostrace-exploiting-and-mitigating-speculative-race-conditions :: NFC driver maintainers, no answer
the-unusual-suspects-studying-reasons-for-lacking-updates-in-wordpress :: 482 webshop owners cold-called to recruit interviewees (287 answered), deliberately not framed as a vulnerability notification
transparency-or-information-overload-evaluating-users-comprehension-and-perceptions-of-the-ios-app-privacy-report :: 'Most Contacted Domains'
empirically-measuring-data-localization-in-the-eu :: servers contacted
lost-in-the-mists-of-time-expirations-in-dns-footprints-of-mobile-apps :: app hostnames
because-i-didnt-touch-these-and-even-dont-know-why-i-should-to-change-these-why :: 5,000 developers contacted for a survey about privacy labels
dead-domains-living-data-a-privacy-risk-analysis-of-domain-lifecycle-in-android :: apps contacting a domain
the-tcf-doesn-t-really-a-a-id-automatic-privacy-analysis-and-legal-compliance-of :: domains contacted with AAID
missing-present-and-conflicting-a-large-scale-analysis-of-iot-update-information :: customer service contacted as a buyer

The kind label mobile was renamed apps in CAMPAIGNS because the Alexa-skill campaign is not mobile; the three 2021–2022 Play Store campaigns moved with it. The printed kinds table changed accordingly.

Seven papers with notifiedAffectedParties == yes ∧ platforms ∋ web, picked deterministically one per year across 2013–2026, checked after de-hyphenating and whitespace-collapsing both the quote and paper.cols.txt:

4 exact, 1 partial, 2 spliced-but-locatable, 0 unlocatable, 0 fabricated. Consistent with the corpus README's 57.9% exact / 37% via an 8-word run / 0.9% unlocatable. No ethics quote is quoted on the content page, so this check was for confidence in the enum, not to validate a published string.

Every load-bearing quote on the content page was re-checked by the orchestrator against paper.cols.txt after the sub-agents reported it, because sub-agent line numbers are not by themselves evidence.

Every quote written onto the content page in this revision, plus the figures behind the new table rows, is in out/notify_quotes_20260904.json — 69 quotes across 22 papers — and scripts/notify_quotecheck2.mjs re-checks them against paper.cols.txt after normalising both sides (de-hyphenation, straight quotes, non-ASCII dropped, whitespace collapsed). Result on 2026-09-04: 69 EXACT, 0 MISSING (67 before the figures review added two) (out/notify_quotecheck2-output.txt). Five of the 69 are short fragments because the full sentence is column-spliced in paper.cols.txt and only exists interleaved with another column: the Alexa paper's “111 (45.12%) no longer pose a threat” and “whenever we have their contact details”; the SEISE paper's whole disclosure paragraph (lines 1668–1678 interleave with a Related-Work paragraph about Evilseed); and the ASI paper's “acknowledgement for 38 disclosures”. Each was read in place by the orchestrator. Three normaliser bugs were found and fixed before the check passed — the first version dropped newlines with the non-ASCII characters and reported 54 of 67 missing; the sed repair then deleted the whitespace collapse. Recorded because a quote check that fails for the wrong reason is easy to “fix” by weakening it. The repaired checker was mutation-tested: a fabricated sentence appended to the JSON is reported MISSING and the exit code is non-zero.

Sub-agent findings not carried onto the page, because the orchestrator re-read the passage and judged them inferences rather than the paper's statement: the ROAlert paper's “52 administrators” (assembled across a 58-line column gap; the page says “52 administrators engaged”, which is what the two fragments say, but the denominator for the 52 is not stated and is not implied on the page); the ROAlert “~15% of uncontactable operators” as a “control” (the page calls it a comparison group the paper reports, not a randomised control). Internal inconsistencies the sub-agents flagged and the page carries as the paper states them: the Alexa paper's 45 + 24 + 41 = 110 against its own 111 (stated on the page); the CSP paper's discussion-section denominators of 30 against Section IX-B's 31 (the page uses none of the survey percentages); “Tickets to Hide” printing 11.1% (table) and 11.7% (prose) for the same botnet-C&C rate (neither is on the page).

Two errors in the first published version, caught by the orchestrator's own re-check after publication and fixed in revision 2:

• The [15Sasaki, Takayuki; Fujita, Akira; Gañán, Carlos Hernandez; van Eeten, Michel; Yoshioka, Katsunari; Matsumoto, Tsutomu (2022): "Exposed Infrastructures: Discovery, Attacks and Remediation of Insecure ICS Remote Management Devices", in: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. (DOI)] row said “93 (58%) responded — 'higher than most previous notification experiments'”. Wrong on three counts. The channel is manual telephone calls, not email — the paper explicitly contrasts itself with prior studies that used IP-WHOIS abuse contacts and claims to be “the first study to directly contact the organization operating the device”. The 93 (58%) is a spliced Table VI cell, not a response rate. And “higher than most previous notification experiments” is about the paper's remediation rate, not its response rate. The corrected row uses the paper's own funnel: 160 operators notified about 317 devices, the person in charge reached for 212, “50% of the persons in charge … stated that they mitigated or will mitigate”, devices “reduced by 58% when we were able to contact the persons in charge” against 13% for un-notified devices, χ² p<0.0001. This came from a sub-agent report that the orchestrator did not re-verify before first publication — the one place on the page where the verification discipline recorded above was not actually followed.
• The [16Cetin, Orcun; Gañán, Carlos; Altena, Lisette; Kasama, Takahiro; Inoue, Daisuke; Tamiya, Kazuki; Tie, Ying; Yoshioka, Katsunari; van Eeten, Michel (2019): "Cleaning Up the Internet of Evil Things: Real-World Evidence on ISP and Consumer Efforts to Remove Mirai", in: Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium. (Link)] control column said “74% natural remediation in the control”. The paper says “surprisingly high natural remediation rates of 58[–]74% for this control group and for two reference networks” — a range across three groups, not a single control figure. Also added: “Email-only notifications have no observable impact compared to a control group”, which is the more important half of that paper for this page.

Discovering the first of these prompted a new subsection on the content page: phone calls and hand-read imprints are the channels with the highest measured rates in this literature, and the page's earlier flat statement that telephone “does not scale” was true only at [14Stock, Ben; Pellegrino, Giancarlo; Rossow, Christian; Johns, Martin; Backes, Michael (2016): "Hey, You Have a Problem: On the Feasibility of Large-Scale Web Vulnerability Notification", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)]'s N of 44,790. That claim is now qualified rather than repeated.

One internal inconsistency, not resolved: [14Stock, Ben; Pellegrino, Giancarlo; Rossow, Christian; Johns, Martin; Backes, Michael (2016): "Hey, You Have a Problem: On the Feasibility of Large-Scale Web Vulnerability Notification", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)] states a 2.4% control fix rate for client-side XSS in prose and 2.2% (4/185) in Table 1. The page quotes the table.

One inconsistency reported by a sub-agent and excluded: [17Stöver, Alina; Gerber, Nina; Pridöhl, Henning; Maass, Max; Bretthauer, Sebastian; Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Indra; Hollick, Matthias; Herrmann, Dominik (2023): "How Website Owners Face Privacy Issues: Thematic Analysis of Responses from a Covert Notification Study Reveals Diverse Circumstances and Challenges", in: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. (DOI)] Figure 1 says 1,495 owner responses while the body text says 1,043 (1,043 + 452 bounces/auto-replies = 1,495). Neither number is on the content page.

[2Stock, Ben; Pellegrino, Giancarlo; Li, Frank; Backes, Michael; Rossow, Christian (2018): "Didn't You Hear Me? - Towards More Successful Web Vulnerability Notifications", in: Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium. (DOI)], NDSS 2018, “Didn't You Hear Me? – Towards More Successful Web Vulnerability Notifications”. data/fulltext/2018/NDSS/ does not exist — NDSS 2016 and NDSS 2018 full text was not retrieved at all, while both years are present in data/corpus2/.meta. This is the canonical follow-up to the two 2016 campaigns, so it was fetched from the publisher (ndss-symposium.org PDF from the index's pdfUrl) and extracted with pdfminer.six (pdftotext is not installed in this workdir). Figures taken from it, with their locations in that extraction: population >24,000 domains in seven arms of ~4,000; fix rates 24% (Git) / 17% (WordPress) notified vs 13% / 14% control; six email variants with Fisher's exact + Holm–Bonferroni (m=6, α=0.05), all Git arms significant, only the Mailbot arm significant for WordPress, and “no group performed significantly better than all others”; bounce-all rates 1,085/8,160 (13.3%) Git and 1,906/12,442 (15.3%) WordPress; 74.42% / 33.33% fix rate among those who viewed the report; 24.7% among Git operators who opened the mail but never viewed the report; first reminder worth ~7 pp at two weeks and ~11 pp at four weeks, second reminder worth nothing. This is the one page figure not reproducible from the corpus mount.

A Sonnet sub-agent ran the currency pass; every load-bearing item was then re-fetched by the orchestrator, because the sub-agent hit HTTP 403 on several primary sources and fell back to search-engine caches. What follows separates the two.

• CERT/CC: 45-day default embargo — certcc.github.io, quoted verbatim, HTTP 200 on the sub-agent's fetch.
• Google Project Zero: 90+30 days, 14-day grace, 7 days for actively-exploited bugs, plus the Reporting Transparency trial from 29 July 2025 — projectzero.google. Also caught that googleprojectzero.blogspot.com now 301-redirects to projectzero.google, so the blogspot URL is stale; the page says so.
• Shadowserver: still free, 201 national CSIRTs, 175 countries — shadowserver.org.
• RFC 2142 still current, unrevised — rfc-editor.org / datatracker.
• RIPE validates abuse-mailbox at least annually; ARIN validates Abuse POCs annually — docs.db.ripe.net, arin.net NRPM.
• Abusix Abuse Contact DB still free and not rate-limited — docs.abusix.com. Relevant because [14Stock, Ben; Pellegrino, Giancarlo; Rossow, Christian; Johns, Martin; Backes, Michael (2016): "Hey, You Have a Problem: On the Feasibility of Large-Scale Web Vulnerability Notification", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)] used it in 2016.
• Venue calls: IMC 2026 (direct), IEEE S&P 2026 (direct), CCS 2026 (direct), PoPETs 2026 (direct — no vulnerability-notification clause found, which is what the page says).

• USENIX Security 2026 ethics wording. usenix.org returns 403 to automated fetches. The sub-agent read it from a search-engine cache. The page carries a footnote saying exactly this and telling the reader to check the live call. This is the only external claim on the page resting on a cache.
• ISO/IEC 29147:2018 and ISO/IEC 30111:2019 review status. iso.org returns 403 to both the sub-agent and the orchestrator. The page names the two standards and what they cover but makes no claim about edition, review status or a pending revision — that was cut rather than published on a search snippet.
• CISA's Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure process. cisa.gov 403s. The sub-agent reported new joint CISA/NSA CVD guidance dated 15 July 2026 from secondary sources. Cut from the page entirely rather than published unverified. Worth adding once someone can fetch it.
• CERT/CC Vultron. Reported as explicitly “not yet ready for production use”. Cut, because a non-production protocol is not a channel a PhD student can use this year.
• Bugcrowd / Intigriti / YesWeHack third-party report acceptance. No primary policy page found either way. The page therefore claims the 2016 “reward programmes only serve their customers” premise no longer holds for HackerOne specifically, and says nothing about the others.

• uriports.com, “Follow-Up on Security.txt Adoption: Progress and Pitfalls in 2025” (24 January 2025): 0.7% of “the top one million domains” in April 2024, 1.25% in 2025, 44% RFC-compliant. Rejected again: the ranking list is not named, no method, a vendor's validator-marketing blog. Recorded because its numbers will come up in a search.
• hexiosec.com “1 Million Websites — How Many Use Security.txt?” and scotthelme.co.uk Top 1 Million Analysis, June 2026: surfaced by search; not fetched, because neither was needed once two peer-reviewed measurements existed. The Helme crawl is a general web-security crawl, not a security.txt study.
• Vekaria, Nithyanand, Shafiq, “Towards Multi-Stakeholder Vulnerability Notifications in the Ad-Tech Supply Chain”, arXiv 2406.06958 (v. April 2026): a nine-month notification study using ads.txt and sellers.json contacts, with a reported 79.5% delivery-and-opening rate. Not cited: the venue could not be established (the arXiv page names none; the corpus index has three other Vekaria papers but not this one), and its figures were only seen in a search-engine summary, which this page does not quote. Worth adding if it appears in a corpus venue — it would be the highest delivery rate on the page and the first campaign through ads.txt.
• Brandt et al., “Snail Mail Beats Email Any Day” (ARES 2021): surfaced by search as a postal-letter notification study on network operators. Outside the seven venues and not fetched; the postal result the page already carries is [4Maass, Max; Stöver, Alina; Pridöhl, Henning; Bretthauer, Sebastian; Herrmann, Dominik; Hollick, Matthias; Spiecker, Indra (2021): "Effective Notification Campaigns on the Web: A Matter of Trust, Framing, and Support", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)].

The sub-agent's first pass surfaced these; all were rejected as SEO, marketing or reseller content rather than primary, and none reached the page: whois.is blog, ipgeolocation.io, viewdns.info, myiphelp.com, decryptiondigest.com, secureframe.com, plaxidityx.com, standards.iteh.ai ISO reseller mirrors, dokumen.pub, secportal.io, craevidence.com, 0xlanks.me, uriports.com and iotdef.com security.txt adoption-statistics blogs, claimdepot.com, and the WHOIS-marketing explainers at abion.com, ionos.com, dynadot.com and safenames.net. Two — dreyfus.fr and cadeproject.org — were used only to corroborate the ICANN Registration Data Policy date while the ICANN page was 403ing, and became unnecessary once the orchestrator fetched ICANN directly.

notes/find_contacts.py on the page is the real file, and the code block under it is its real, unedited output from a run on 2026-08-13 against google.com ethz.ch cispa.de bbc.co.uk wikipedia.org.

Three things about that output are worth recording rather than tidying away:

• The same script on the same five domains gave 80% RIR-abuse coverage in one run and 100% in another, purely because stat.ripe.net timed out once for google.com. The published block is the 100% run (it matches the current code); the 80% run is recorded here, and the content page states the discrepancy explicitly rather than presenting either number as a coverage measurement. Five domains and a transient — this is why the page says the sample is hand-picked and not representative.
• .ch and .de having no RDAP service in the IANA bootstrap is a real finding, not a script bug — confirmed by reading dns.json directly.
• A reviewer found a real bug and it was fixed. _rdap_base() fetched the IANA bootstrap registry with no error handling, so a single transient failure there raised an uncaught URLError and killed the whole batch — contradicting the script's own promise that failures are printed rather than swallowed. It now raises a RuntimeError naming the URL and the reason, and refuses to continue, on the grounds that the alternative (a column of dashes) would silently understate RDAP coverage for every domain at once. Verified both paths: the happy path prints the table above, and pointing BOOTSTRAP at an unreachable host raises with full context. This is the second defect on this page that only surfaced because someone re-ran the code rather than reading it.

Design decisions in that script, all of them arguable:

• Domain WHOIS omitted on the currency grounds above. A 2016-vintage version of this script would have made WHOIS the primary source.
• RIPEstat rather than an Abusix DNS TXT lookup for abuse contacts, because this workdir has neither dig nor dnspython and code that cannot be executed cannot be published as tested. Abusix is the cheaper choice at scale and is what [14Stock, Ben; Pellegrino, Giancarlo; Rossow, Christian; Johns, Martin; Backes, Michael (2016): "Hey, You Have a Problem: On the Feasibility of Large-Scale Web Vulnerability Notification", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)] used; RIPEstat is the choice that runs with nothing but the Python standard library. The script's docstring does not say this; the page does not either. It should.
• mailto: scraping omitted, though it is the highest-yield source. Documented in the docstring with the reason.
• The five test domains are hand-picked, not sampled, and the page says so and gives the contrasting corpus figure, because 80% security.txt coverage against [8Poteat, Tara; Li, Frank (2021): "Who You Gonna Call? An Empirical Evaluation of Website security.txt Deployment", in: Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference. (DOI)]'s 3–4% at the top 10K is the kind of number that gets quoted out of context.

21 new entries added to Bibliography before its closing </bibtex>. Generated with node scripts/bibgen.mjs, i.e. from data/corpus2/.meta publisher metadata rather than from recall. Checked before saving: 23 distinct citation keys used on the content page, 0 unresolved, 0 colliding with the 239 keys already in the file.

Two entries already existed and were reused rather than duplicated: maass2021_effective and hantke2024_redlines.

Author lists that the index does not carry — 100% of PETS and USENIX records have no authors and no DOI, they are scraped from venue pages — were fetched from the venue pages with curl and a browser User-Agent (WebFetch gets 403 from usenix.org): stock2016_hey, li2016_youve, nguyen2021_sharefirst, squarcina2021_subdomain, munteanu2025_catch22, utz2023_comparing, stoever2023_owners. Keys generated by bibgen with a guessed first author were renamed to the real one after fetching: findlay2021_securitytxt → poteat2021_securitytxt, curtain2026_behind → stivala2026_behind, keys2025_file → elyadmani2025_keys, tajalizadehkhoob2021_whowas → lu2021_whowas, hlavacek2024_rov → qin2024_rov, elazari2017_legalrisks → gamerogarrido2017_legalrisks, mirian2022_ics → sasaki2022_ics, tatang2022_spfail → bennett2022_spfail. bibgen also emitted the slug in place of the title for cetin2019_cleaning; fixed by hand.

stock2018_didnt was hand-written from the NDSS index record plus the DOI printed in the PDF (10.14722/ndss.2018.23171), since bibgen cannot reach a venue-year with no full text.

• Whether the 32 hand-classified campaigns are the whole set. Nothing is unreviewed, but two of the ten campaigns added on 2026-09-04 were found by a topical grep rather than by the narrow rule; the probe written afterwards catches one of them, so one campaign (the-security-lottery) remains outside both committed rules, and 201 of 229 rejections were screened at sentence level. A third rule would find more. See The recall lesson above.
• Any response rate from the corpus schema. ethics.disclosureDetail carries a countable ratio in 7 of 2,870 cases. Every rate on the content page came from a paper's results section, read by hand. A schema field for “notification outcome, with denominator” would make this page regenerable; there isn't one.
• Whether security.txt contacts actually work — narrowed on 2026-09-04, not closed. Six corpus papers that notified sent to security.txt contacts (list above; two of them are campaigns in CAMPAIGNS, four are rejected as campaigns), so the channel has been used; none reports delivery or response for it separately, so the per-channel question stands. What the corpus does answer is coverage: 23 domains ([18Drakonakis, Kostas; Ioannidis, Sotiris; Polakis, Jason (2020): "The Cookie Hunter: Automated Black-box Auditing for Web Authentication and Authorization Flaws", in: Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. (DOI)]), 25 of 256 ([19Roth, Sebastian; Calzavara, Stefano; Wilhelm, Moritz; Rabitti, Alvise; Stock, Ben (2022): "The Security Lottery: Measuring Client-Side Web Security Inconsistencies", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 2047-2064. (Link)]), 34 of the top-100 services ([20Bhattacharya, Arkaprabha; Daffalla, Alaa; Lee, Kevin; Bellini, Rosanna; Dell, Nicola; Ristenpart, Thomas (2026): "Inconsistent, Incomplete, and Insecure: A Survey of Account Security Interfaces", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)]). [21Hilbig, Tobias; Geras, Thomas; Kupris, Erwin; Schreck, Thomas (2023): "security.txt Revisited: Analysis of Prevalence and Conformity in 2022", Digital Threats: Research and Practice 4(3):36:1-36:17. (DOI)] states the delivery test as future work in so many words.
• Current security.txt adoption — closed to the extent the literature allows. Still no re-measurement in the seven corpus venues after 2021. Two peer-reviewed measurements outside them ([22Findlay, William P.; Abdou, AbdelRahman (2022): "Characterizing the Adoption of Security.txt Files and their Applications to Vulnerability Notification", in: Proceedings of the Workshop on Measurements, Attacks, and Defenses for the Web (MADweb), co-located with NDSS. (DOI)], [21Hilbig, Tobias; Geras, Thomas; Kupris, Erwin; Schreck, Thomas (2023): "security.txt Revisited: Analysis of Prevalence and Conformity in 2022", Digital Threats: Research and Practice 4(3):36:1-36:17. (DOI)]) run to January 2023 on Tranco, and the page now carries them; the only 2025–2026 figure is a vendor zone scan (0.24%) that the page footnotes as unverifiable. A reader in September 2026 still has no citeable figure newer than January 2023.
• Whether the framing effect is real. [4Maass, Max; Stöver, Alina; Pridöhl, Henning; Bretthauer, Sebastian; Herrmann, Dominik; Hollick, Matthias; Spiecker, Indra (2021): "Effective Notification Campaigns on the Web: A Matter of Trust, Framing, and Support", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)] found a large, significant fine-framing effect; [5Utz, Christine; Michels, Matthias; Degeling, Martin; Marnau, Ninja; Stock, Ben (2023): "Comparing Large-Scale Privacy and Security Notifications", in: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. (DOI)] found none. Different countries, issues, media and populations. The page presents the contradiction rather than picking a side. Resolving it needs a study that varies framing while holding medium and jurisdiction fixed.
• Whether the RCT result generalises. [11Lone, Qasim; Frik, Alisa; Luckie, Matthew; Korczyński, Maciej; van Eeten, Michel; Gañán, Carlos (2022): "Deployment of Source Address Validation by Network Operators: A Randomized Control Trial", in: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. (DOI)] found no effect on network operators deploying SAV — an expensive, low-visibility configuration change. It does not follow that notification fails for a web vulnerability an operator can fix in ten minutes, and [4Maass, Max; Stöver, Alina; Pridöhl, Henning; Bretthauer, Sebastian; Herrmann, Dominik; Hollick, Matthias; Spiecker, Indra (2021): "Effective Notification Campaigns on the Web: A Matter of Trust, Framing, and Support", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)]'s 56.6%-vs-9.2% with a proper control says it does not. The page says the RCT undermines control-free studies, not that notification does not work. A reasonable person could read the page as more pessimistic than the evidence supports; this was the hardest calibration call on it.
• Non-EU/US practice. Every campaign in the table notified operators in Europe, North America or globally, and framing effects rest on German Impressum law. There is nothing here about notifying operators in jurisdictions with no equivalent legal hook.
• Venues. EuroS&P, ACSAC, RAID, AsiaCCS, CHI and SOUPS are absent from the corpus. CHI/SOUPS is where much of the operator-facing usable-security work appears, so the page's account of what website owners think and need is thinner than the literature.

Run after the three focused passes and their fixes. Seventeen findings; fourteen accepted, three partly.

Re-ran both script invocations (byte-identical to the committed outputs), checked every number in sections A–D, the trend table, the count reconciliation (32 = 26 + 6; 179 = 28 + 151; 78 = 3 + 75; 229 = 154 + 75; 201 sentence-level; 13/13/6), all rates-table rows and the new prose against paper.cols.txt, ran the quote checker and find_contacts.py. Roughly 150 figures; five findings.

Checked six load-bearing attributions against the source text. Five matched: the “Tickets to Hide” figures (2.6%; 72% Netcraft; Spamhaus 60%, 83% and 84% across three categories, which the page brackets as 60–84%; 126,085 → 411 → 4; 30,467 → none); the ROAlert “about 15%” as an observational comparison group, not a randomised arm; every bhattacharya2026_asi figure and quote; the Hilbig et al. table and its future-work sentence; the Findlay & Abdou 0.49% / 1.6% and dates. Two findings:

Four reviewers, all told the context might not be exhaustive, all given the page text, the report script, its output, and these notes. Three focused passes ran in parallel first; the generic pass ran after their findings were applied.

• A table rendered with every figure in the wrong column, and no reviewer caught it. The trend table's first row labelled its indicator with a backslash-escaped pipe — | Notified (''yes''\|''partial'') | — but a backslash is not a DokuWiki escape for a literal pipe. The renderer treated it as a cell separator, splitting the label in two and shifting all six percentages one column left, so the 2010–2013 figure appeared under Denominator and the last bucket rendered empty. Caught by parsing the live page's HTML, where that row came back as ['Notified (yes\', 'partial)', 'empirical ∧ ethics', '21.3%', …] against a seven-column header. Fixed by writing the label as “yes or partial” and avoiding the pipe entirely. The figures reviewer checked every number against the script and passed the page; every number was right and the table was still wrong. Checking a wiki page means parsing the rendered HTML, not only the source — the table-cell counts of both pages are now asserted from the live HTML.
• The downloadable code was verified end to end. curl on /_export/code/practices/notifying_websites?codeblock=0 → python3 -m py_compile → an actual run against ethz.ch. What a reader downloads from the page compiles and works. Worth doing because the code block on the page is a transcribed copy with em-dashes substituted for ASCII, and a substitution inside a string literal would have broken it silently.
• A stale page cache made most citations render as raw keys, and it survived four reviewers and every verification pass above. After the bibliography was extended and the pages saved, https://measuretheweb.org/practices/notifying_websites rendered [lone2022_sav], [utz2023_comparing], [stock2018_didnt] and most others as literal bracketed keys, while the two pre-existing keys resolved normally. Nothing was wrong with the source, the bibliography or the keys — DokuWiki was serving a cached render made before the bibliography grew. Fixed by requesting each page once with &purge=true; both then rendered 218 and 98 resolved citations with zero raw keys left. Add a purge to the end of any run that touches literature:bibliography, and re-check the rendered page after purging rather than before. The earlier checks in this section counted bibtex_citekey markers and found 38 on a page with ~60 citations, which should have been the tell and was not.
• All eight internal links (Artifacts, Design:Website selection, Literature:Corpus, Practices:Ethics, Practices:Legal enforcement, Practices:Public relations, Statistics:Hypothesis testing, Statistics:Pvalue corrections) fetched 200 with real content — no red links. ?do=sitemap is cached and still listed the new page as missing, as expected.

The crawled ∧ assessed a law cross-tab (N=123) was not a reviewer finding — it was added afterwards because none of the existing rows described the reader the page is written for, someone who crawled the web and found a legal-compliance violation. It is the one cell where no (14.6%) is as common as partial, more than three times the corpus-wide 4.3%. The script row and the page row were added together and the pasted output above was regenerated. This means the reviewers did not see this figure; it is the newest and least-checked number on the page, though it comes from the same enum and the same script as the rows above it.

The most productive of the four. Eleven findings, all accepted; five were wrong or self-contradicting claims on the content page.

Also confirmed by this pass and not changed: the page answers its own question and the top-to-bottom ordering works; no dead-weight sections; all DokuWiki constructs well-formed in the current revision; the rates table's 17 rows reconcile with this page's accounting; every corpus figure matches a fresh script run; the embedded script runs as documented; and the voice, while denser in bolding and aphorism than the older hand-written pages, sits inside the range of the site's newer corpus-backed pages.

Every substantive finding across all four passes was accepted. Two are worth separating from the rest because they say something about the process rather than the page:

• The figures pass found no figure error at all — every corpus number checked out — but found the one real code defect. Re-running beats re-reading.
• The quotes pass independently reproduced the [15Sasaki, Takayuki; Fujita, Akira; Gañán, Carlos Hernandez; van Eeten, Michel; Yoshioka, Katsunari; Matsumoto, Tsutomu (2022): "Exposed Infrastructures: Discovery, Attacks and Remediation of Insecure ICS Remote Management Devices", in: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. (DOI)] diagnosis the orchestrator had already made, and caught an over-correction on [16Cetin, Orcun; Gañán, Carlos; Altena, Lisette; Kasama, Takahiro; Inoue, Daisuke; Tamiya, Kazuki; Tie, Ying; Yoshioka, Katsunari; van Eeten, Michel (2019): "Cleaning Up the Internet of Evil Things: Real-World Evidence on ISP and Consumer Efforts to Remove Mirai", in: Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium. (Link)] that the orchestrator's own fix had introduced. A correction is as capable of being wrong as the thing it corrects.

[1]

Zuo, Chaoshun; Lin, Zhiqiang (2022): "Playing Without Paying: Detecting Vulnerable Payment Verification in Native Binaries of Unity Mobile Games", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)

[2]

Stock, Ben; Pellegrino, Giancarlo; Li, Frank; Backes, Michael; Rossow, Christian (2018): "Didn't You Hear Me? - Towards More Successful Web Vulnerability Notifications", in: Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium. (DOI)

[3]

Blechschmidt, Birk; Stock, Ben (2023): "Extended Hell(o): A Comprehensive Large-Scale Study on Email Confidentiality and Integrity Mechanisms in the Wild", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)

[4]

Maass, Max; Stöver, Alina; Pridöhl, Henning; Bretthauer, Sebastian; Herrmann, Dominik; Hollick, Matthias; Spiecker, Indra (2021): "Effective Notification Campaigns on the Web: A Matter of Trust, Framing, and Support", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)

[5]

Utz, Christine; Michels, Matthias; Degeling, Martin; Marnau, Ninja; Stock, Ben (2023): "Comparing Large-Scale Privacy and Security Notifications", in: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. (DOI)

[6]

El Yadmani, Soufian; Gadyatskaya, Olga; Zhauniarovich, Yury (2025): "The File That Contained the Keys Has Been Removed: An Empirical Analysis of Secret Leaks in Cloud Buckets and Responsible Disclosure Outcomes", in: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. (DOI)

[7]

Bennett, Nathaniel; Sowards, Rebekah; Deccio, Casey T. (2022): "SPFail: Discovering, Measuring, and Remediating Vulnerabilities in Email Sender Validation", in: Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference. (DOI)

[8]

Poteat, Tara; Li, Frank (2021): "Who You Gonna Call? An Empirical Evaluation of Website security.txt Deployment", in: Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference. (DOI)

[9]

Stivala, Giada; Mrowczynski, Rafael; Hellenthal, Maria; Pellegrino, Giancarlo (2026): "Behind the Curtain: How Shared Hosting Providers Respond to Vulnerability Notifications", in: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. (DOI)

[10]

Li, Frank; Durumeric, Zakir; Czyz, Jakub; Karami, Mohammad; Bailey, Michael; McCoy, Damon; Savage, Stefan; Paxson, Vern (2016): "You've Got Vulnerability: Exploring Effective Vulnerability Notifications", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)

[11]

Lone, Qasim; Frik, Alisa; Luckie, Matthew; Korczyński, Maciej; van Eeten, Michel; Gañán, Carlos (2022): "Deployment of Source Address Validation by Network Operators: A Randomized Control Trial", in: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. (DOI)

[12]

Lu, Chaoyi; Liu, Baojun; Zhang, Yiming; Li, Zhou; Zhang, Fenglu; Duan, Haixin; Liu, Ying; Chen, Joann Qiongna; Liang, Jinjin; Zhang, Zaifeng; Hao, Shuang; Yang, Min (2021): "From WHOIS to WHOWAS: A Large-Scale Measurement Study of Domain Registration Privacy under the GDPR", in: Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium. (Link)

[13]

Canali, Davide; Balzarotti, Davide; Francillon, Aurélien (2013): "The Role of Web Hosting Providers in Detecting Compromised Websites", in: Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference. (DOI)

[14]

Stock, Ben; Pellegrino, Giancarlo; Rossow, Christian; Johns, Martin; Backes, Michael (2016): "Hey, You Have a Problem: On the Feasibility of Large-Scale Web Vulnerability Notification", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)

[15]

Sasaki, Takayuki; Fujita, Akira; Gañán, Carlos Hernandez; van Eeten, Michel; Yoshioka, Katsunari; Matsumoto, Tsutomu (2022): "Exposed Infrastructures: Discovery, Attacks and Remediation of Insecure ICS Remote Management Devices", in: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. (DOI)

[16]

Cetin, Orcun; Gañán, Carlos; Altena, Lisette; Kasama, Takahiro; Inoue, Daisuke; Tamiya, Kazuki; Tie, Ying; Yoshioka, Katsunari; van Eeten, Michel (2019): "Cleaning Up the Internet of Evil Things: Real-World Evidence on ISP and Consumer Efforts to Remove Mirai", in: Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium. (Link)

[17]

Stöver, Alina; Gerber, Nina; Pridöhl, Henning; Maass, Max; Bretthauer, Sebastian; Spiecker gen. Döhmann, Indra; Hollick, Matthias; Herrmann, Dominik (2023): "How Website Owners Face Privacy Issues: Thematic Analysis of Responses from a Covert Notification Study Reveals Diverse Circumstances and Challenges", in: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. (DOI)

[18]

Drakonakis, Kostas; Ioannidis, Sotiris; Polakis, Jason (2020): "The Cookie Hunter: Automated Black-box Auditing for Web Authentication and Authorization Flaws", in: Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. (DOI)

[19]

Roth, Sebastian; Calzavara, Stefano; Wilhelm, Moritz; Rabitti, Alvise; Stock, Ben (2022): "The Security Lottery: Measuring Client-Side Web Security Inconsistencies", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 2047-2064. (Link)

[20]

Bhattacharya, Arkaprabha; Daffalla, Alaa; Lee, Kevin; Bellini, Rosanna; Dell, Nicola; Ristenpart, Thomas (2026): "Inconsistent, Incomplete, and Insecure: A Survey of Account Security Interfaces", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)

[21]

Hilbig, Tobias; Geras, Thomas; Kupris, Erwin; Schreck, Thomas (2023): "security.txt Revisited: Analysis of Prevalence and Conformity in 2022", Digital Threats: Research and Practice 4(3):36:1-36:17. (DOI)

[22]

Findlay, William P.; Abdou, AbdelRahman (2022): "Characterizing the Adoption of Security.txt Files and their Applications to Vulnerability Notification", in: Proceedings of the Workshop on Measurements, Attacks, and Defenses for the Web (MADweb), co-located with NDSS. (DOI)

[23]

Durumeric, Zakir; Kasten, James; Adrian, David; Halderman, J. Alex; Bailey, Michael D.; Li, Frank; Weaver, Nicholas; Amann, Johanna; Beekman, Jethro; Payer, Mathias; Paxson, Vern (2014): "The Matter of Heartbleed", in: Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference. (DOI)

[24]

Munteanu, Cristian; Smaragdakis, Georgios; Feldmann, Anja; Fiebig, Tobias (2025): "Catch-22: Uncovering Compromised Hosts using SSH Public Keys", in: Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium. (Link)

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